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Editorial
This edition of Humanitarian Exchange is dedicated to the humanitarian response to 
the influx of refugees and vulnerable migrants into Europe over the past year. One of the 
most notable features of the European response, as Pamela DeLargy notes in her lead 
article, is the central role volunteers have played – in stark contrast to the much slower 
response of international agencies and donors. Laetitia de Radigues and Ludovico 
Gammarelli give an overview of the European Commission’s response. Key findings of 
research led by Coventry University on the complex picture of migration into Greece 
are summarised by Heaven Crawley, while Jessica Hagen-Zanker and Richard Mallett 
highlight the limitations of deterrence policies in determining people’s migration 
choices. Amelia Stoenescu and colleagues report on International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM) data and information-sharing systems to track movements in the 
Western Balkans, while Gareth Walker discusses the challenges of addressing the 
health needs of mobile populations. 
Returning to the issue of volunteerism, John Borton reflects on the potential implications 
for humanitarian action, while Emma Eggink and Melinda McRostie give a first-hand 
account of the evolution of the Starfish Foundation, a grassroots volunteer initiative 
on Lesvos. The contribution of Hellenic Red Cross volunteers is highlighted by Kate 
Latimir, and Rachel Erskine and Katie Robertson outline RedR’s training programme for 
volunteers. In a pair of articles, Elodie Francart, Michaël Neuman and Angélique Muller 
reflect on Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)’s experience in Brussels and northern France in 
engaging with NGOs, volunteer groups, municipal officials and political activists. Alexandre 
Le Clève, Evangeline Masson-Diez and Olivier Peyroux underline the predicament of 
unaccompanied children in camps in northern France and along the Channel coast, while 
Minh Tram Le and colleagues highlight the importance of infant and young child feeding 
for refugees stranded in Greece. The edition ends with articles by Emily Whitehead and 
Theo Hannides and colleagues reflecting on the findings from an independent evaluation 
of the Start Network’s collaborative response and the findings of Start-funded research 
on the information and communication needs of refugees in Greece and Germany.
As always, we welcome any comments or 
feedback, which can be sent to 
hpn@odi.org.uk or to the HPN Coordinator, 
203 Blackfriars Road, London SE1 8NJ.
Editorial photos:
Left: A boat full of refugees from Syria and 
Afghanistan is helped by volunteer life-guards, 
after reaching the island of Lesvos, Greece.
©UNHCR/Achilleas Zavallis
Top: The new Grande Synthe camp near Dunkirk, 
France.
©MSF
Middle: A pile of discarded lifejackets in Lesvos, 
Greece.
©Mary Finn
Bottom right: A UNHCR staff member helps a cold 
and wet refugee child on Lesvos, Greece.
©UNHCR/Hereward Holland
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Volunteers help a Syrian refugee ashore on Lesvos, Greece.
©UNHCR/Achilleas Zavallis
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In May, the World Humanitarian Summit brought govern-
ments, the UN, NGOs and the private sector together for 
wide-ranging discussions on how to improve humanitarian 
response through innovative thinking, better coordination 
and stronger participation. Yet even as leaders were pledging 
their commitment to humanitarian principles and standards, 
families from Aleppo were sitting in the hot sun in Greece, many 
without even basic shelter. These people were emphatically 
not ‘participating’ in the planning for their well-being or being 
‘empowered’ in their relationships with local authorities. Child 
refugees travelling alone were left to fend for themselves in 
Athens, Paris, Rome and Calais, exploited and abused. Across 
Europe, the birthplace of modern humanitarianism, women 
who had suffered egregious sexual exploitation and violence 
in Libya were labelled economic migrants, not refugees, and 
thus deemed not eligible for either asylum or humanitarian 
assistance. Although some European states offered asylum 
and a future to those arriving, many others did not. 
Europe’s actual humanitarian response must be judged a failure 
in many respects; basic needs have not been met and vulnerable 
people have not been protected. The lack of agreement 
about ‘burden-sharing’ in the region, rising xenophobia and 
Islamophobia, fear of terrorism and the demonisation of 
refugees and migrants have all played a role in creating this 
chaotic situation. Meanwhile, poorer countries in regions that 
host the great majority of the world’s refugees are asking why 
they are expected to respect humanitarian standards and 
refugee law when wealthy Europe has chosen not to.
A sudden surge – but a predictable one
The numbers were big, and sudden, but not entirely unpredict-
able: there had been a steady movement of refugees and 
migrants into Europe for decades, but from summer 2015 the 
numbers taking the Balkan route increased dramatically. Over 
a million people sought refuge in just a few months. Yet this 
should not have been a complete surprise.  Flight to Europe, 
after all, is linked to humanitarian challenges elsewhere. 
Insufficient funding for the Syrian regional humanitarian 
appeal meant a loss of services for more and more Syrians in 
the region. Combined with restrictions on employment and 
the depletion of savings, this prompted many to look for a 
more secure future elsewhere. Afghans, cut off from traditional 
routes east due to the draconian sea interception policies 
adopted by Australia, joined Syrians on the Balkan route to 
Europe. Lack of employment and educational possibilities for 
urban Eritrean refugees in Sudan and Sudanese refugees in 
Egypt led young people to risk the route through Libya to Italy. 
War in Yemen pushed long-settled Somali refugees back across 
the Red Sea to became part of the flow of people from the Horn 
of Africa to Libya and Italy. Thus, the flight to European shores 
reflected not only the pull of greater long-term security in 
Europe, but also the failure of the international humanitarian 
community to meet basic needs in other places. 
State responses
European governments varied widely in their willingness to 
provide humanitarian support. Many simply failed to respond, 
whether out of inexperience, lack of resources (Greece) or 
outright hostility to the refugees (sometimes on religious or 
cultural grounds). Some states even exacerbated the crisis 
by purposely making movement as difficult as possible by 
closing borders or forcing people to walk long distances (when 
it would have been relatively simple to provide transport) or 
by punishing refugees with detention, family separation and 
sometimes physical violence. In short, state responses often 
made the humanitarian situation worse, either as a reflexive 
hostile response to what was seen as an ‘invasion’ or as a policy 
justified as a deterrent to new arrivals. In fact, deterrence 
has been a persistent theme in European policy discussions. 
Politicians across the continent have defended all manner of 
security responses as deterrents, including suggesting that 
expanding maritime search and rescue operations would only 
encourage more people to come. The refusal to provide basic 
humanitarian support to refugees and to have them suffer on 
the streets has even been claimed as a ‘humanitarian’ policy 
since it might prevent more people from risking their lives on 
dangerous sea crossings. 
Humanitarian challenges
The demographics of the movement to Europe have changed 
constantly, along with the routes, meaning that it has not been 
easy to profile humanitarian needs at any one point in time. 
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Earlier movements on almost all routes were composed of 
young men, with few families, but this changed quickly on the 
Balkan route in the summer of 2015 when women and children 
joined. More recently, the Libya–Italy route has seen a dramatic 
increase in young women, and the numbers of unaccompanied 
children have also increased substantially. Not knowing who 
was where and not predicting migration patterns impeded 
humanitarian response planning, and data and information 
systems to track arrivals had to be developed.
Another important factor has been people’s constant mobility. 
In many humanitarian settings, people flee seeking safety 
and arrive somewhere where they stay for a while (even for 
years), and basic services can be established and humanitarian 
assistance delivered in a relatively stable setting. Humanitarian 
agencies are very familiar with the delivery of camp-based 
services, but the refugees arriving in Europe have been 
extremely mobile, and often determined to keep moving to 
a particular further destination. Humanitarian responders – 
established humanitarian groups as well as volunteers – had 
little experience designing responses for transient populations. 
Traditional humanitarian actors also had limited experience in 
the European context and no presence in affected areas. The 
international humanitarian system, largely designed to deal 
with displacement in other, poorer regions, was blindsided by 
the sudden arrival of a million refugees into Europe. 
Most international humanitarian organisations had no opera-
tional agreements with European governments, no presence in 
refugee-affected areas, no funding lines for European activities 
and no ways to mobilise resources for a response in Europe. Many 
also feared getting involved. After all, if an agency is dependent 
on, say, UK government funding, it might not be a good idea to be 
seen to be helping out in Calais. There was great dithering about 
mandates for action. The international humanitarian system 
– so often led by European NGOs and funded by European 
states and the European Union (EU) – faltered when it had to be 
mobilised on European territory. Agencies with long experience 
negotiating humanitarian access in places like Sudan, Myanmar 
or Syria seemed to have no idea how to negotiate with the 
mayor of Calais. Médecins du Monde (MDM) was the first of the 
big humanitarian agencies (and the only one) to establish a 
presence in summer 2015 in the Calais ‘jungle’, but struggled to 
find funding from any traditional donors. Many of the traditional 
agencies took time to establish programmes in Greece and 
still do not work in the rest of Europe. National and local Red 
Cross societies performed heroically in some countries and 
communities, but did nothing at all in others.
The role of volunteers
While the big agencies debated and traditional donors delayed 
funding, individual citizens and community groups across 
Europe started providing for humanitarian needs. The role of 
volunteers in the European response has been truly remarkable, 
as ‘everyday’ humanitarians responded in dozens of ways: 
collecting and sorting clothes or food for distribution, providing 
first aid, building shelters, rescuing people from the sea, cooking, 
setting up laundries, starting libraries and language courses, 
digging drainage ditches and putting in water pipes. You name 
it, volunteers have done it. In transit sites such as Budapest, 
volunteers greeted exhausted refugees with snacks, blankets 
and medical care. In Greece and Italy, fishermen rescued 
people from the sea and local villagers fed and clothed them. 
In Calais, volunteers came to help the small French community 
organisations that for years had been struggling to provide 
assistance and advocate on behalf of refugees. They not 
only built shelters and brought supplies, they also organised 
themselves into sectors – water and sanitation, shelter, health – 
replicating the cluster system common to emergency responses 
throughout the world. Volunteers began to do professional needs 
assessments. A team from Birmingham University, appalled 
at conditions in Calais, conducted a hygiene and sanitation 
assessment which was eventually used in the French courts to 
force the municipality to provide improved water and sanitation. 
Many early Calais volunteers moved on to help in Greece as Syrians 
began arriving on the islands. They helped local communities to 
rescue and care for refugees for months before any of the major 
humanitarian agencies began to respond. Even today, volunteers 
– both Greek and from elsewhere in Europe – bear the brunt of the 
humanitarian response in Greece. Thousands more are a lifeline 
for refugees all over Europe. 
While the vitality of the humanitarian spirit in so many 
Europeans is reassuring, the heavy dependence on volunteers 
also presents challenges for humanitarian action. Although 
volunteers have tremendous energy and a can-do spirit, 
many are untrained and inexperienced; this can lead to 
uncoordinated and sometimes ill-advised responses and also 
to their own burn out. Another consequence of depending 
on volunteers is that where humanitarian standards are not 
being applied (or are not even known), humanitarian response 
can be compromised. The role of volunteers in the European 
response deserves serious research, not only as a way to 
understand and improve the response but also to help in other 
regions where local responders are becoming more and more 
important components of humanitarian action. 
Information, communication and social 
media
As usual, refugees themselves have been creative, resilient and 
their own best advocates and information providers. While 
the EU came up with plan after (mechanical) plan for the ‘fair’ 
relocation of refugees within EU Member States (which many 
members flat out rejected), states debated national immigration 
and asylum policies and humanitarian agencies debated their 
roles, refugees took action to seek their own solutions and find 
their own protection. They used their own means of information 
sharing and lesson learning to get access to basic services. 
Many observers have noted the importance of mobile phones 
in the European migration (though too many foolishly ask 
whether a ‘real’ refugee would have a mobile phone, implicitly 
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highlighting the stereotype of the deserving refugee as 
someone far away and very poor). Indeed, the constant 
sharing of information on route closures and means of 
transport, and the regular updates to family and friends, have 
been a prominent aspect of this population movement. The 
use of social media like Facebook and WhatsApp has been 
an important feature of the communication patterns among 
refugee groups (as well as smuggling networks). But social 
media has also been absolutely critical for the recruitment 
and organisation of volunteers. There are hundreds of 
Facebook sites where volunteers share information. Although 
some groups and governments have begun to recognise 
the importance of social media for reaching refugees and 
migrants, the main focus so far seems to be establishing 
campaigns to discourage people from migrating, such as the 
new Italian campaign featuring refugees and migrants sharing 
their negative experiences and disappointments about 
migration. Much more could be done to support refugees 
using social and other media. 
So, what now in Europe? 
Understanding more about what has happened in Europe, 
including the distinctive aspects of the humanitarian context, 
can be a start towards improving the situation. But it is clear 
that the problems are not primarily logistical or organisational. 
The primary impediment to effective humanitarian action 
in Europe right now is the lack of political will on the part of 
European governments and the inability of the EU to achieve a 
consensus on migration and refugee policies. The humanitarian 
community cannot remain isolated from the larger political 
debates about migration policies because these policies are 
largely determining the humanitarian space in Europe. 
Day after day, policies adopted across Europe undermine or 
violate humanitarian principles. What do neutrality and imparti- 
ality mean when some people are provided with protection 
or assistance simply because of their nationality? Or when 
some are demonised and discriminated against based on their 
religion? What does independence mean when the Red Cross in 
one country is a major humanitarian responder, but in another 
is inhibited from assisting people labelled as ‘illegals’ or ‘alien 
invaders’? And what about humanitarian standards? Should 
it not be shocking that a displacement camp in Darfur has 
better sanitation, nutritional support, shelter, health care and 
protection programmes than the places where refugees are 
staying in Greece or France?
Much of Europe is focused on stopping migration and asylum-
seeking, not on protecting people and ensuring human 
rights. The EU agreement with Turkey in March 2016, though 
marketed in humanitarian terms, was primarily designed to 
stop the inflow of refugees into EU territory through Greece 
by returning new arrivals to Turkey in exchange for taking 
selected refugees directly from Turkey. The agreement also 
provides for up to €3 billion for refugee support in Turkey and 
the elimination of visa restrictions for Turkish citizens travelling 
to Europe. It is so flawed that Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) 
decided to refuse EU funding rather than compromise its 
positions on human rights and refugee law. Dozens of other 
NGOs have also condemned the agreement as a violation of 
non-refoulement in refugee law, and some have decided not to 
work in Greece given the conditions. EU initiatives with African 
governments after the Valletta Summit on African–European 
migration in late 2015 have focused on limiting migration by 
strengthening African border controls and security, as well 
as providing assistance with job creation in an attempt to 
discourage out-migration. Agreements with countries such as 
Sudan, Ethiopia and Niger are also worded in humanitarian 
language, but based on questionable assumptions about 
migration decision-making, at the very least. Many observers 
see all of these agreements as an attempt to pay others to stop 
people from moving to Europe, no matter the human rights 
implications. Whether motives are mixed or not, it is clear 
that the resources devoted to attempts to control migration 
– whether on security and border controls or deterrence and 
‘incentivisation’ efforts – dwarf the resources being allocated 
to actual humanitarian response.
The greater the investment in security and border controls, 
the more dangerous the journey to Europe becomes, and 
the more lives are lost. Establishing safe, regular and orderly 
means of seeking asylum is crucial. Acceptance of greater 
numbers under the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) third-country resettlement programme could be part 
of such an effort. At the UN in September, European countries 
join the rest of the world in pondering how to deal with the 
global migration challenge, and to determine how refugees 
and others can be protected. Better policy based on better 
thinking is urgently needed. 
Pamela DeLargy is on loan from the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) 
as Senior Advisor to the UN Special Representative for Migration. 
She is also a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Global Affairs at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). 
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The European Union (EU) is the main humanitarian donor 
worldwide. The European Commission, through its Directorate-
General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid 
Operations (DG ECHO), has over the past 25 years provided 
funding and expertise to address needs caused by natural 
disasters and conflict. The Treaty of Lisbon underpins the EU’s 
commitment to provide assistance, relief and protection to 
victims of natural or man-made disasters around the world, 
and to support and coordinate the civil protection systems of 
its Member States. The humanitarian model established in the 
Treaty therefore identifies a clear role for European humanitarian 
aid to respond to needs outside of the EU. Today, however, the EU 
faces an unprecedented humanitarian emergency inside its own 
territory, raising new challenges for the European Commission.
EU humanitarian assistance and refugee 
response
Between January 2015 and February 2016, over 1.1 million 
people made their way to the EU, escaping conflict and 
poverty in their countries and seeking a better and safer life. 
The majority of these people used the Western Balkan route, 
reaching the Greek islands by boat from Turkey, continuing 
on to the mainland and the northern border of Greece and 
crossing into the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM) and then onwards to Central and Northern Europe. 
EU humanitarian aid has been active in countries of origin 
(Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan) and in countries of arrival and transit, 
including Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, FYROM and Serbia. Globally 
in 2015, the European Commission allocated almost three-
quarters of its annual humanitarian aid budget (over €1 billion) 
to projects helping refugees and internally displaced people. 
The Commission supports refugees in Turkey who have fled 
violence in both Syria and Iraq, with particular emphasis on 
vulnerable people living outside of camps. Since the beginning 
of the Syria crisis in 2011, the Commission has provided a total 
of €455 million in assistance in Turkey, including humanitarian 
aid and longer-term assistance. In November 2015, the EU set 
up the Refugee Facility for Turkey, through which EU institutions 
and Member States have committed to funding up to €3 billion.
EU humanitarian funding in the non-EU countries along the 
Balkan route (FYROM and Serbia) assists refugees, asylum-
seekers and migrants in need and contributes to the provision 
of emergency assistance in places with high concentrations of 
refugees, including borders and registration points. Funding 
of over €21m is enabling nine partners to provide people in 
need with key essentials such as temporary shelter, food, 
health services and protection, in particular child protection. 
Establishing a new humanitarian 
instrument
Migration is not a new phenomenon in Europe, and European 
institutions have over many years developed a series of tools 
to address the needs faced by people on the move. To tackle 
the current migration crisis, the European Commission, 
through its Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs 
(DG HOME), mobilised two main instruments, the Asylum, 
Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and the Internal 
Security Fund (ISF) and the Fund for European Aid to the 
Most Deprived (FEAD) through its Regional Policy Directorate 
General (DG REGIO). 
When the borders along the Western Balkan route were closed 
in March 2016, more than 55,000 people were left stranded in 
Greece. To support the Greek authorities as well as international 
organisations and NGOs operating in Greece in managing the 
refugee crisis, the Commission has awarded over €345m under 
these instruments since the beginning of 2015. This emergency 
funding comes on top of the €509m already allocated to Greece 
under the national programmes for 2014–2020. Greece itself 
responded generously to the needs of refugees, both through 
informal private groups of volunteers and with a significant 
effort by the Greek government to coordinate relief efforts and 
provide direct assistance. In December 2015, when the situation 
in Greece stretched available resources beyond their limit, 
Greece appealed to other European civil protection agencies 
for help. Through the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM), 
coordinated by the Commission, in-kind support such as 
shelter, hygiene materials and medical supplies was provided 
to help Greece cope with the increasing number of arrivals. 
This request is still open, and some civil protection agencies 
continue to provide materials and expertise today. 
The magnitude of needs made it clear that an exclusive res-
ponse by national authorities was not sufficient, despite the 
tremendous efforts made by the Greek authorities, assisted 
by local initiatives, to organise the reception of hundreds 
of thousands of refugees. The presence and engagement of 
humanitarian NGOs and international organisations provided 
national first responders with technical capacity, but lacked 
the necessary financial support. With their role becoming more 
and more important, funding and coordination became crucial 
requirements to ensure a more flexible and timely response.
On 19 February 2016, the European Council called for urgent 
and concrete proposals from the Commission to ‘put in place 
the capacity for the EU to provide humanitarian assistance 
internally’. The Commission responded immediately with a 
Applying the European Commission’s humanitarian expertise to 
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Two young girls walk through a makeshift camp near the village of Idomeni in Greece. 
©UNHCR/Achilleas Zavallis
proposal for a new Regulation to provide emergency financial 
support for humanitarian relief operations, to support Member 
States and complement their actions. The Council adopted 
the Regulation on 15 March. 
Following a needs assessment to determine funding priorities, 
on 19 April, just five weeks after the adoption of the Regulation, 
European Commissioner Christos Stylianides announced a 
first allocation of €83m to eight organisations: the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Fede-
ration of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Oxfam, the 
International Rescue Committee, the Danish Refugee Council, 
Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund Deutschland, Save the Children and 
Médecins du Monde (MDM). At the time of writing (August 2016), 
an additional allocation of up to €115m is under discussion to 
address four operational priorities:
1. Shelter: ‘winterising’ existing sites, potentially 
opening new sites and upgrading some sites in line 
with plans designed by the Greek authorities.
2. Multi-Purpose Cash Transfer: developing full coverage 
of needs including food and non-food items, transport 
and phone communication. 
3.  Education: supporting plans developed by the Greek 
Ministry of Education.
4. Unaccompanied Minors: providing residential options, 
including care, case management and psychosocial 
support. 
Challenges
For an institution used to funding humanitarian aid outside 
the EU, providing emergency assistance within the Union was 
not without challenges. 
The Emergency Support Instrument (ESI) mirrors the practice 
of EU humanitarian aid provision outside the EU, which is 
provided based on needs and on the humanitarian principles 
of humanity, impartiality and neutrality. Impartiality 
requires that humanitarian aid must be provided solely on 
the basis of need, without discrimination between or within 
affected populations. Given that Greece has been suffering 
from a deep economic crisis, Greek nationals in need could 
also have been included in the target population. The 
general assessment of the Commission’s humanitarian aid 
partners, and of the Greek authorities, was that refugees, 
asylum-seekers and migrants lacking access to services and 
family networks were in most need. Services provided with 
this new funding would not cover the local population, which 
could be supported by other EU-funded instruments. In 
terms of operational priorities, the ESI would not be involved 
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in relocation, resettlement and return schemes, which are 
funded by other Union instruments.
Independence refers to the freedom of humanitarian objectives 
from political, economic, military or other objectives, and 
ensures that the sole purpose of humanitarian aid is to 
relieve and prevent the suffering of victims of humanitarian 
crises. In this sense, in order to preserve the independence of 
humanitarian partners it is important to distinguish between 
the support provided by the European Commission to the 
management of migration politics and the funding of emergency 
relief operations for the benefit of refugees, asylum-seekers and 
migrants. Humanitarian aid is not a crisis management tool.
One illustration of this is the operational decision to exclude 
the so-called ‘hotspots’ from the funding provided through 
the ESI. After the EU–Turkey Statement of 20 March, these 
‘hotspots’ became closed centres with a prominent function in 
the management of asylum processes, and hence instruments 
of a migration and asylum policy that is not the primary 
objective of the ESI. As such, despite being fully coordinated 
with the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), Frontex, the 
Greek Asylum Service and other actors operating inside the 
centres, the ESI does not fund operations in them, although 
should needs require the expertise of a humanitarian partner 
the ESI could be activated to support this. 
Another prerequisite was to find the additional financial 
resources required without having a detrimental effect on 
levels of humanitarian assistance provided outside the 
territory of the EU. This has been resolved by using funds 
exclusively earmarked for internal use. However, with €83m 
already contracted and up to €614m more budgeted in 2016–18, 
the response to the emergency in Europe might look high when 
compared to other humanitarian crises outside of the EU. Two 
points are worth making: first, a humanitarian crisis affecting a 
Member State of the EU is a whole new theatre of humanitarian 
operations, requiring a much higher initial investment in 
the development of infrastructure, partners’ capacities and 
coordination models; and second, such a crisis calls for a much 
higher commitment from the EU budget compared to crises 
where other donors are also actively involved. 
Funding humanitarian assistance in a Member State for the 
first time might have challenged the principle of impartiality. 
In fact, most EU-funded policies are implemented through 
Member States. However, mirroring the practice of humani-
tarian aid outside of the EU, the ESI preserved partners’ 
independence by excluding the national authorities as a 
potential operational partner. In doing so attention must 
be paid to the need to ensure good coordination between 
humanitarian partners and the authorities, which remain 
in charge of the overall response. In the case of Greece, 
a regular coordination meeting allows dialogue and the 
exchange of views between the humanitarian partners, DG 
ECHO, and the Greek authorities.
Conclusion
Facing the largest refugee movement in Europe since the 
Second World War, the EU has succeeded in mobilising fresh 
resources to address the needs of these people, aiming 
to show solidarity, both towards refugees and towards 
the Member States that find themselves on the front line. 
Maintaining humanitarian principles as the common theme 
for its action, the Commission’s efforts have focused on its 
traditional role of addressing human suffering, with particular 
attention to the most vulnerable. 
The support provided so far has allowed more than 40,000 
refugees and migrants to access basic medical services; 
30,000 to benefit from psychosocial support; improved water 
and sanitation facilities, including gender-adapted facilities, 
for 37,000 people; and put in place child-friendly spaces. As 
needs evolve, the Commission and its partners will have to 
demonstrate flexibility and the capacity to intervene in a 
continuously changing context, which may include opening 
new operations in other Member States should the need 
arise.
Laetitia de Radigues and Ludovico Gammarelli, European 
Commission, Directorate General for European Civil Protection 
and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO). Responsibility for 
the information and views set out in this article lies entirely 
with the authors.
Beyond ‘mass movement’: understanding the dynamics of migration 
into Greece
Heaven Crawley
In 2015, a million refugees and migrants crossed the 
Mediterranean to Europe in search of safety and a better life. 
The vast majority (84%) of these people arrived by sea to 
Greece, crossing the Aegean from departure points dotted 
along the Turkish coast. In the last four months of 2015 the 
narrative of Europe’s ‘migration crisis’ – which had been 
dominated by the stories of hundreds of people drowning in 
the Mediterranean between Libya and Italy earlier in the year – 
came to be defined instead by stories of hundreds, sometimes 
thousands, of people arriving every day on the Greek islands 
of Lesvos, Kos and Chios. Images of boats carrying desperate 
men, women and children landing on the beaches, to be met 
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by volunteers who had travelled to Greece to assist with the 
humanitarian effort, and of celebrities and politicians visiting 
to see what was happening for themselves, filled newspapers 
around Europe and across the world. 
But these stories of ‘mass movement’ into Greece conceal 
a much more complex picture. Migration policy is currently 
driven by moral and political panic, patchy knowledge and 
broad assumptions about the people at the heart of the 
story: refugees and migrants themselves. Understanding 
the dynamics of migration across the Aegean provides an 
insight into the needs, fears and aspirations of those on the 
move, enables a more effective humanitarian response and 
challenges political and media representations of refugees 
and migrants as an undifferentiated mass. 
Since September 2015 a team of researchers led by Coventry 
University has been examining the dynamics, determinants, 
drivers and infrastructures underpinning recent migration 
across, and loss of life in, the Mediterranean.1 Our research 
in Greece took place between September 2015 and January 
2016, when arrivals reached their peak. During that time 
we interviewed 215 refugees and migrants in Athens and 
Lesvos, and 28 stakeholders from government, international 
organisations and civil society. We were also able to observe 
events as they unfolded, including political and policy 
responses at the local, national and international levels. This 
article provides an overview of what we found, focusing on 
the reasons why people are on the move, the complex array of 
factors that shape the journeys they make and the need for safe 
and legal access to protection.
Why people move
According to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), 
90% of those arriving in Greece in 2015 came from just three 
countries, Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. When we asked our 
respondents to explain why they had decided to leave their 
home countries or the countries in which they were living, the 
vast majority (88%) cited conflict, persecution and human rights 
abuses. The circumstances under which people have been 
forced to leave vary considerably by both country of origin and 
in relation to the individual, familial and group characteristics 
of our respondents. Some people have been targeted for their 
involvement in conventional political activity, or the activities 
of family members. Others, the majority of those from Syria, left 
because the violence had become intolerable and because they 
A man lifts his son in the air after reaching Lesvos, having crossed from the coast of Turkey to Greece. 
© UNHCR/Achilleas Zavallis
1 The MEDMIG project is funded by the UK Economic and Social Research 
Council (ESRC) and the Department for International Development (DFID). 
Further information about the project can be found on our website: www.
medmig.info.
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feared for their safety and that of their families. Often caught 
between competing forces (the Assad regime, the Free Syrian 
Army, the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), Islamic State (IS) and 
others), and subject to almost daily barrel bombings, sniper fire 
and other attacks, many had left to find a future and a better 
life, particularly for their children.
Syria is not the only country in conflict: indeed, there is 
a striking similarity in the experiences of those from Iraq 
and Afghanistan, many of whom described situations of 
both generalised conflict and violence targeted at specific 
groups, often based on religion or ethnicity. In addition 
to these general experiences of conflict, three key issues 
affected a significant proportion of those interviewed, 
namely IS, kidnapping and forced conscription. More than 
a quarter (28%) of respondents talked about the impact on 
their lives of the arrival of IS, particularly in Syria but also in 
Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen. Many respondents described 
experiencing detention and torture and being forced to 
witness beheadings. They expressed grave concern for the 
safety of their families, particularly women (wives, sisters, 
daughters) who were perceived to be non-compliant with 
strict Sharia laws concerning their dress and behaviour. 
Respondents from Syria and Iraq in particular also described 
kidnapping as an increasingly common threat to their safety 
and that of their families. In Eritrea, Syria and Iran, forced 
conscription into the government army, militia or rebel force 
was a major factor underlying the decision to leave. Eritreans 
in particular described military conscription as a form of 
forced or slave labour, with poor working conditions, low or 
no salary and no prospects of release.
Conflict has a huge impact on people’s ability to make a 
living by killing primary breadwinners, destroying businesses 
and making it impossible to travel to work. It also has a 
major impact on the economic infrastructure of a country, 
significantly increasing the prices of basic goods and com-
modities. In Syria, price increases have been exacerbated by 
internal displacement and the movement of large numbers 
of people to some of the safer cities. Many of those who leave 
situations of conflict find themselves in very difficult economic 
circumstances in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey as a result of 
limited rights, exploitation by employers and discrimination in 
the labour market (and beyond). These circumstances propel 
them onwards. A third (34%) of respondents had moved on 
for what might typically be understood as economic reasons: 
they were running out of money, found it impossible to secure 
employment or were working long hours for very little pay. 
With the passage of time and in the absence of a resolution to 
the conflicts in their home countries, respondents told us that 
they had grown increasingly concerned about the impacts on 
their families, and especially their children, many of whom had 
been out of school for many years or had health issues.  
It is clear that the drivers of migration to Greece are multi-
faceted, and there is often overlap between ‘forced’ and 
‘economic’ factors. This poses a significant challenge, both 
for policy-makers – who need to find ways of squeezing 
complex human experiences into a series of narrowly defined 
categories – and for those providing humanitarian assistance, 
who find themselves working with people who may have been 
on the move for years, living in poverty and fear, and lacking 
access to even basic healthcare and education. 
Journeys and decision-making
Media coverage of the arrival of refugees and migrants in 
Greece gives the impression of a linear, uninterrupted move- 
ment of people heading towards Europe. This is often 
represented through graphics depicting arrows from North 
Africa and the Middle East into Greece and Italy.2 This 
representation is, however, grossly misleading. Our research 
instead indicates complex movement in terms of the routes 
taken, the number of countries crossed, the mix of regular and 
irregular movement within the whole journey and the points in 
the journey at which the services of a smuggler are engaged. 
Migration into Europe is made up of distinct ‘sub-flows’ from 
many countries and regions, and includes individuals and 
families with diverse trajectories. These flows merge in Turkey 
and Libya, explaining, in part at least, the magnitude of arrivals 
in Greece and Italy in 2015. There are Syrians coming directly 
from Syria and from the Gulf countries, where they had been 
labour migrants, and others were living as refugees in Lebanon 
or Turkey. Afghans may come directly from Afghanistan, but 
also from Iran or from other countries where they have been 
living for many years, or may even have been born.
It is clear from our research that the process by which refugees 
and migrants make decisions about where to go is highly 
complex and contingent on a range of variables. The asylum 
and migration policies of different European countries appear 
to play a relatively minor role: refugees and migrants have 
only partial information about migration policies in particular 
countries, and more than a fifth (22%) of those we interviewed 
in Greece told us they did not know which country they wanted 
to go to or were heading to ‘Europe’. This was particularly 
the case for those with limited education, some of whom 
were unaware that Europe comprises different countries. For 
them, as for the majority of respondents, the most important 
priority was to reach a country in which they felt safe. Where 
specific migration policies were cited as influencing decisions, 
these were more often related to securing refugee status and 
opportunities for family reunification than welfare benefits 
or support. In fact, we found that the single most important 
factor above all others shaping and informing the decision 
about where to go is the presence of family members or other 
social contacts (friends, acquaintances) in European countries. 
Nearly two-thirds (59%) of those who mentioned a preferred 
2 See, for example, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35486655 
in the UK and  http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/world/europe/a-mass-
migration-crisis-and-it-may-yet-get-worse.html?_r=0 in the US. Many more 
examples can be found through a simple google search of ‘migration to 
Europe’.
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destination had connections in specific European countries, 
and said that this was an important factor influencing 
their journey. This was particularly evident among Syrian 
respondents, many of whom maintained almost daily contact 
with relatives and friends (by telephone, Facebook, WhatsApp 
and Viber), but could also be seen among Afghans (travelling 
both directly from Afghanistan and from Iran) and Iraqis.  
The need for safe and legal routes
The situation in Greece has changed dramatically in the period 
since we conducted our research. By the end of July 2016, 
there had been just over a quarter of a million arrivals by sea 
to Europe, the majority (62.5%) crossing to Greece. However, 
although more people arrived in the first seven months of 
2016 than in the same period in 2015 (160,000 compared to 
130,000), the vast majority arrived in the first three months 
of the year. Since then, only 8,770 refugees and migrants have 
crossed the sea to Greece, compared with 117,662 in the same 
period in 2015, a fall of 93%. 
The reasons for the dramatic fall in arrivals to Greece since 
March 2016 lie not in improvements in the countries from 
which refugees and migrants originate (in Syria, Iraq and 
Afghanistan the situation has arguably deteriorated over 
recent months) but rather in the introduction of policies at 
the national and European Union (EU) levels designed to 
contain refugees and migrants in Turkey and Greece, thereby 
stemming the flow into other parts of Europe and, in turn, 
reducing the political crisis with which migration across 
the Mediterranean has come to be associated. It is not only 
increased security introduced as part of the EU–Turkey deal 
which has made the difference. Many of those who had been 
intending to travel to Europe from Turkey have decided not 
to make the dangerous journey across the Aegean for fear of 
being trapped in Greece, with the prospect of detention, no 
jobs and limited access to asylum.
Given the limitations of space it is not possible to explore these 
developments in detail here. The interface between refugee 
and migrant flows and the policies of EU Member States is a 
focus of our final report. Nonetheless, the evidence presented 
here on the drivers, decision-making and destinations of 
those who crossed the Aegean to Greece in the final months of 
2015 suggests that the pressures that propel people forward 
on their journeys are likely to increase rather than decrease 
with the passage of time. 
Whilst conflict, human rights abuses and persecution continue 
to drive people from their homes, efforts on the part of the 
EU to significantly expand the opportunities for refugees to 
access protection through safe and legal routes have met 
with limited success. In May 2015 the Commission presented 
a comprehensive European Agenda on Migration which 
recognised the need to prevent those fleeing conflict and in 
need of protection having to resort to the criminal networks 
of smugglers. Yet since then just 8,268 people have been 
resettled, mainly from Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. 
The European Commission has acknowledged the need to 
significantly increase the scale and speed of resettlement, and 
on 13 July announced that a new EU Resettlement Framework 
would be established to ensure orderly and safe pathways 
to Europe for people in need of international protection. It 
remains to be seen whether this will be delivered in practice, 
but even if it is the scale of resettlement is likely to be 
insufficient to address the considerable, and growing, need. 
Around two-thirds of the people crossing the Aegean to Greece 
in 2016 are women and children seeking to join male family 
members (husbands, brother, sons) who successfully made the 
journey to Europe in 2015. As of the end of July, 57,182 people 
were stranded in Greece, many of whom have been unable to 
access procedures for asylum or family reunification. By mid-
June, the refugee relocation scheme, which the European 
Commission has explicitly described as an act of European 
solidarity and responsibility-sharing, has relocated just 1,503 
people from Greece, 2.2% of the 66,400 originally agreed.
The evidence presented here sheds light on the complexity 
of migration flows across the Aegean from Turkey to Greece. 
Contrary to the dominant political and media narratives, which 
have presented this movement as a single, linear flow, our 
research reveals significant variations in terms of the drivers 
of migration and the factors that inform refugee and migrant 
decision-making, as well as their preferred destinations. 
The extent to which policies designed to deter refugees and 
migrants can have the effect that is intended or assumed 
is challenged by the ad hoc and dynamic decision-making 
processes of people on the move. To address such diverse and 
composite flows requires a coherent policy response that is also 
nuanced, tailored and targeted. Deterrence and containment 
policies aimed at immobilising people in countries of origin 
or transit without resettlement or humanitarian assistance 
will only deepen the human suffering. The absence or slow 
realisation of safe and legal access to protection (most notably 
resettlement and family reunification) simply increases the 
demand for smugglers, pushing people into taking ever more 
risky routes into and within Europe.
Heaven Crawley is Chair in International Migration for the 
Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations at Coventry 
University.
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On the limits of deterrence
Jessica Hagen-Zanker and Richard Mallett 
Is it possible for European governments to put people off the 
idea of migrating?1 This is the question we set out to answer in 
the summer of 2015, at the height of the so-called ‘migration 
crisis’ – the height, at least, as defined by the extent of media 
coverage around the time. Our research was motivated by a 
desire to interrogate the assumption among European policy-
makers and politicians that it is within the power of states to 
stop people from coming to Europe. 
In the broadest sense, the European response to mass popu- 
lation movements has been guided by strategies of contain-
ment, restriction and deterrence. Rather than welcome, 
settle and integrate the new arrivals, European Union (EU) 
member states have largely sought to drive them away from 
their borders through increasingly restrictive migration 
policies. We have seen the construction of border fences, the 
militarisation of frontiers (accompanied by violence towards 
refugees and migrants), increases in aid to ‘regions of origin’ 
and countries deemed powerful enough to contain flows, 
and the intensification of information campaigns designed to 
convey the risks in journeys to Europe, as well as the lack of 
support upon arrival.
Each of these measures are geared towards deterring migration 
and are in one way or another premised on the idea that 
regulation occurs by changing people’s minds: make the journey 
(appear) more difficult or the destination more unwelcoming 
and people will think twice about selecting that option; instead, 
they might take their chances elsewhere or stay put. To put this 
to the test, we talked to people who did make the journey to 
Europe, most of them through irregular means. We carried out 
52 interviews with Eritrean, Senegalese and Syrian respondents 
recently arrived in four European cities – London, Manchester, 
Berlin and Madrid. In these interviews, we spent time going 
through people’s journeys in great detail, homing in on their 
decision points at key moments of the process. We asked why 
they left when they did, how they got from place to place and 
their reasons for ending up where they have. For the purposes 
of this article, we focus on the forced migration of interviewees 
from Syria, and to a lesser extent on the journeys of Eritrean 
Refugees at the border between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).
©UNHCR/Achilleas Zavallis
1 This article is based on J. Hagen-Zanker and R. Mallett, Journeys to Europe: 
The Role of Policy in Migrant Decision-making, Insights Report (London: 
Overseas Development Institute, 2016). Some parts of it draw directly on the 
original report.
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respondents. Given that the experiences of the Senegalese in 
our sample are characterised by a non-humanitarian form of 
migration, we do not include them in the analysis.
Information drives movement, but trusted 
information is what really matters
In one sense, the policy-makers have got it right: people act 
on the basis of the information available to them. This squares 
with the logic of sending signals that intend to deter migration, 
such as the adverts taken out in Lebanese newspapers paid for 
by the Danish government highlighting the tough regulations 
awaiting any would-be asylum-seekers from the Middle East, 
or the messages on the Norwegian government’s Twitter page 
threatening Afghans with deportation back to Kabul should they 
try to enter the country without documents. Of course, there are 
other versions of deterrence policy at play: visa regulations and 
carrier sanctions are one, as is the securitisation of international 
borders, including those beyond European territory. But both 
of the above ‘messaging’ cases nonetheless exemplify a long-
popular approach, where ‘new’ pieces of information might 
be considered, by their architects, powerful enough to change 
people’s minds. The problem with such an approach is that 
it essentially operates out of context. The information these 
messages contain might be perfectly credible; to many of 
us, knowledge about a certain country’s asylum policies or a 
particular route’s precariousness would appear useful. Under 
certain circumstances, however, there is not a great deal of 
value or meaning in their content. Testimonies from Syrians 
and Eritreans suggest that they were actually very aware of the 
risks awaiting them in transit – but years of exposure to violence 
at home had rendered those risks acceptable. In other words, 
a dangerous migration became preferable – indeed, became a 
more rational choice – than staying put. 
The question of whether to cross an international border is 
ultimately a subjective one: migrations are driven as much 
by people’s perceptions of their circumstances (‘how safe do 
I feel here?’; ‘do I think I would fare better elsewhere?’) as they 
are by the objective characteristics of those circumstances 
(the onset or intensification of conflict, a deteriorating labour 
market). Given that such decisions are so intensely personal, 
it perhaps comes as little surprise that external information 
campaigns have little effect. 
Not all information is equal: information does influence the 
decision to migrate, but to be meaningful it first needs to be 
trusted. Our research suggests that information becomes 
trusted or credible when it comes through known personal 
connections. Almost everyone we interviewed recalled 
making key decisions on the basis of other people’s advice. 
More often than not, these people were members either of our 
interviewees’ closest social circles – parents, siblings, good 
friends – or of their wider communities. For Syrians, it seems 
that some of the most trusted information regarding routes 
and options came through Facebook and Whatsapp groups 
shared by fellow Syrians who had already made the journey. 
This was particularly the case for those moving through the 
Balkans route. Likewise with the choice of smuggler: Syrians 
transiting through the Balkans tended to work with smugglers 
who came recommended by personal contacts. When it comes 
to changing someone’s mind about migrating, it seems that 
the messenger is as important as the message. 
Jobs and education: two things that offset 
deterrence policy
Migration policies, and deterrence policies in particular, can 
potentially shape people’s decisions on where to go and how 
to get there. Just as some pieces of information matter more 
than others, so too different kinds of policies exert different 
degrees of influence over a person’s thinking. For young people 
and those with children – and even for those without, but who 
were thinking long term – education was central in shaping 
decisions on destinations. People were interested in finding 
places with a decent school system. In one focus group with 
five Syrian women recently arrived in Berlin, this was the most 
influential factor driving their movement towards Germany. 
Amin, also from Syria but currently in Madrid, summed it up: 
‘When you have children, you need good places’. For people 
escaping conflict and oppression, education must also be 
seen in the context of lost schooling: migration then becomes 
a way, for those affected by chronic humanitarian crises, 
of recapturing foregone human capital. It is also part of an 
attempt to restore a stronger sense of human dignity and to 
re-establish some order and autonomy over daily life. 
Work is another key factor driving people towards particular 
places. Many of those we interviewed expressed a desire to find 
work in the countries they had ended up in, and talked about 
this as one of the things that drew them there originally. Abdu, 
29, arrived in the UK in 2015 after a year-long journey from 
Eritrea. When we talked to him last summer, he explained he 
was ‘not waiting for benefits. I’m not here for that. I want to help 
myself. I don’t want to stay in my home every day’. At the time 
of our interview, Abdu was spending his days either at the job 
centre or simply going from one warehouse to the next, trying 
to find out if any work was going. While this search for decent 
work might often take people to Europe, it does not always start 
off that way. Several Syrian interviewees talked about how they 
initially had no inclination to spend a small fortune getting to 
Germany or Spain, planning instead to reassemble their lives 
just across the border in Turkey or Lebanon. But as Nabil’s story 
in the accompanying box illustrates, the challenges associated 
with doing so, particularly finding a place in the labour market, 
often compel onward movement. 
Aside from the presence of family and friends, our interviews 
suggest that education and employment are the two most 
important factors influencing people’s thinking about where 
to go. Following this, it is theoretically possible for European 
governments to put people off coming – but only by sending 
their countries’ education systems into decline and collapsing 
their economies.
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Diversion is more likely than prevention
The factors that compel people to migrate in the first place do not 
appear to be significantly offset by European countries’ deterrence 
policies. This seems to be because the influence is marginal to 
the range of other forces governing migration decision-making 
(trusted information, perceptions of opportunity and dignity 
abroad). Yet, while we found that deterrence policies don’t stop 
people from coming to Europe, they can influence people’s 
decision on where to go and how to get there, and, as such, shift 
migration flows from one country to another. Hungary provides a 
clear example of this. In justifying the decision to build a border 
fence, Prime Minister Viktor Orban claimed that Europe had 
‘sent out invitations to the migrants’, and that these fences were 
key to protecting Hungarians against the ‘brutal threat’ of mass 
migration. One government spokesperson put it more directly: 
‘This is a necessary step … We need to stop the flood’. 
Through our interviews, we tried to get a sense of how effective 
such controls are at changing people’s minds about coming to 
Europe. When we posed this question to a group of Syrian men 
in Berlin, they told us fences were unlikely to affect people’s 
journeys: ‘Syrians will find a way. It may be harder and more 
expensive, but they will find another route’. This was clearly 
illustrated last summer. Although Hungary (partially) managed 
to keep migrants and refugees out once they had built the 
fence, at the same time this did not stop people coming to 
Europe. Instead, they re-routed themselves through Croatia 
and Slovenia. More recent evidence suggests that, with the 
latest EU–Turkey deal (deporting people back to Turkey who had 
previously entered Greece through irregular means), a decline 
in Aegean crossings has been accompanied by a rise in flows 
through the central Mediterranean.2 
Box 1 Nabil’s story 
Nineteen-year-old Nabil was living with his family just 
outside Aleppo when the actions of ISIS fighters made 
their home unliveable: ‘executions every week, parading 
decapitated heads in the central square’. Prior to ISIS, Nabil 
explained, he had no intention at all to migrate. But now 
more than 90% of his community have left. In January 2015, 
Nabil fled to Gaziantep in Turkey, a city not too far from the 
border. Once there he tried to find work on construction 
sites. But after three months, he was yet to find anything. 
It was this inability to scrape a half-decent living across the 
border which drove Nabil onwards towards Berlin, where 
his older brother had arrived a few months previously.
There are two related points here. First, alternatives usually 
always exist, and routes perceived as unusable at one point 
in time can later emerge as possibilities depending on how 
wider circumstances develop. Second, and as mentioned 
above, harder or more expensive journeys are often not in 
themselves enough of a deterrent to absolute mobility. When 
your ‘home’ is consumed by a humanitarian crisis, the level 
of risk presented by departure – usually very well understood 
by the Syrians we talked to – may be deemed acceptable.
The need for a coordinated European 
approach
Governments believe they can control refugee flows. Our 
evidence suggests this may be possible in some senses 
but not in others. Preventive policies, particularly those 
concerned with deterrence, appear to matter little. At best, 
direct controls like border fences and detention can divert 
flows, essentially passing the buck from one country to the 
next, but do not appear capable of preventing movement 
in the first place. Thus, while such measures might alleviate 
individual countries’ concerns, at the regional EU level they 
make no difference.
Of course, research focusing either on people in transit 
or on those still deciding whether to travel might reveal a 
different picture. It is perfectly possible that some kinds of 
people are put off more by deterrence than others – and that 
it might play a preventive role in certain circumstances. This 
is important further work to be done, which researchers at 
ODI will be engaging in this year. But in our study we find 
that migration trajectories are influenced less by restrictive 
migration policies and more by things like information 
transmitted through close social networks, perceptions of 
‘welcoming-ness’, labour market opportunities and access 
to education.
At its core, this is a regional crisis. Policy-makers should 
be stepping away from unilateral policy-making towards a 
more coordinated European approach. Given that there is 
an inevitability to certain types of (forced) migration, and 
that barriers and disincentives to travel are not necessarily 
effective, the clear response is to manage it better. Improving 
the safety of transit, implementing better European reception 
systems and strengthening integration policies are three 
obvious measures to that end.
Jessica Hagen-Zanker is a Research Fellow in the Overseas 
Development Institute’s social protection team. Richard 
Mallett is a Research Fellow at ODI, where he works primarily 
on the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium project.2 ‘Migrant Influx into Italy from Libya Resurging: IOM’, Reuters, 15 April 2016. 
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Applying information management tools to detect and address 
vulnerabilities in the context of mixed migration
Amelia Stoenescu, Ivona Zakoska, Daniel Szabo and Debora Gonzalez Tejero
Text message: We don’t have any news if usual schedule of 
4 trains (max 940 migrants) in 24 hours will be changed. For 
now, only one train is announced for 8.00 PM.
In 2014, the majority of Europe’s mixed migration flows passed 
through the Central Mediterranean route, with Italy as the first 
point of arrival. By contrast, 2015 saw a significant increase 
through the Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkan 
route, which includes Greece, the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia (FYROM), Serbia, Croatia and Hungary. From the 
beginning of 2015 to the end of June 2016, more than a million 
refugees and migrants arrived in Greece, including vulnerable 
groups such as unaccompanied and separated children, 
pregnant women and people with disabilities. National 
authorities relied on the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) information-gathering and -sharing systems to identify 
risks and coordinate the humanitarian response. This article 
outlines how early warning networks and the Displacement 
Tracking Matrix (DTM) helped make regularly updated data 
available on migrant routes, numbers and protection risks.
Information gaps in an evolving 
emergency
For Europe’s increasing mixed migration flows, the lack of 
consolidated information-sharing mechanisms, and the absence 
of data on specific risks such as trafficking, soon became 
apparent. Considering the scale and speed of migration flows, 
traditional counter-trafficking approaches – initial screening 
and in-depth interviews – struggled to keep up. Countries in the 
region already employed various counter-trafficking measures, 
but these identification and assistance mechanisms were quickly 
overwhelmed in a context where thousands of people were 
crossing borders each day. To contribute to a better-targeted 
response and more timely identification of needs, IOM introduced 
three systems for information collection and dissemination on 
mixed migration flows in the Western Balkans region: an early 
warning information-sharing network; a Displacement Tracking 
Matrix (DTM); and counter-trafficking surveys.
The Early Warning Information Sharing Network: 
the first step in coordinated action
During the peak days in the latter part of 2015, more than 5,000 
migrants and refugees crossed the border from Greece to FYROM 
each day.1 The unprecedented number of people moving across 
state borders prompted the FYROM government to declare a 
state of emergency in August. With initial support provided 
through its Migration Emergency Funding Mechanism (MEFM), 
IOM rolled out the Early Warning Information Sharing Network 
(EWISN). EWISN is an informal structure for real-time information 
exchange between IOM staff, national authorities, other service 
providers and civil society organisations providing assistance. 
The Network provides 24-hour instant messaging-based 
communication between IOM staff regarding mixed migration 
flows at transit points throughout the Balkan route. Staff at 
different points on the route send texts containing information 
on migrant arrivals, migrants on the move and time of departure 
from one point, with estimates of when the group will reach the 
next point on the route. When, in November 2015, the number of 
crossings into FYROM from Greece reached its peak of 102,776 
cumulative arrivals a month, the Network was fully operational 
and allowed for effective coordination of activities between IOM 
staff and institutions, international relief organisations and civil 
society organisations active at local level. 
Text message: IOM Greece (Athens) to IOM Skopje (October 
2015): 1,379 migrants expected to arrive in mainland 
between 06:15 and 09:40. The first group is expected to 
reach the border after 19:00.
In its initial implementation, EWISN included the Greek islands, 
FYROM and Serbia. As mixed migration flows increased signifi-
cantly, other countries, such as Croatia and Hungary, were 
added. Information received was disseminated by focal points 
to an array of service providers. Through the Network, IOM staff 
communicated relevant information, for instance on migrants and 
refugees with mobility difficulties, helping national authorities to 
organise specific transportation to the next transit point. 
Whilst the Network proved highly beneficial in sharing 
rapid-action information, it was only the starting point in 
understanding the complex journeys of migrants and refugees. 
To gain better insight into the structure and profile of people 
on the move, and the assistance they required, a more in-
depth data collection intervention was required.
The Displacement Tracking Matrix and Flow 
Monitoring Surveys: fostering a deeper 
understanding of mixed migration flows 
Text message: IOM Skopje to IOM Belgrade (October 2015): 
Today a train with 8 wagons (app. 1,050 migrants) left at 
12.15. Please confirm when train arrives, if field staff is 
present at entry point. 
1 According to IOM and UNHCR estimates just over 10,000 migrants entered 
FYROM on 18 October 2015, while the highest numbers were registered on 9 
November the same year, when some 11,500 migrants and refugees crossed 
the border from Greece.  
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Text message: IOM Skopje to IOM Belgrade (November 2015): 
Train departing 9.40 a.m. (575 migrants) among which 11 
with disabilities and 7 pregnant women (observed). 
IOM began rolling out Flow Monitoring Surveys (FMS), a 
component of its Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), 
comprising a comprehensive data collection methodology 
and standardised questionnaire to be used along the Western 
Balkans route. The FMS offer a way of observing and better 
understanding trends in mixed migration flows over time 
through structured data collection and analysis and interviews 
with migrants and refugees. Flow monitoring was implemented 
at entry, transit and exit points in Greece, FYROM, Serbia, 
Croatia, Hungary and Slovenia. The surveys capture data on 
the socioeconomic background of respondents, their country 
of origin/habitual residence, reasons for leaving their country 
of origin/habitual residence, the routes they have taken to 
reach the Western Balkans, who they are travelling with and 
their intended countries of final destination. A standard set of 
questions is applied across the route to ensure a basis for cross-
reference and analysis. 
According to the survey findings, the top five transit countries 
outside the Western Balkan route are Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, 
Lebanon and Bulgaria. Data gathered through the surveys in 
the Western Balkans up to 30 June 2016 shows that, of migrants 
interviewed, the most common profile is a 28-year-old male 
who had achieved, up to the point of departure, a secondary 
education. Generally, he travels with a group fleeing armed 
conflict or political persecution. He usually pays between an 
estimated $1,000 and $5,000 for his journey.2 
While the Flow Monitoring Surveys and the Network captured 
important data on the journeys of migrants and refugees, they 
did not shed light on the dangers migrants faced during their 
journey. The limited opportunities for legal migration created 
a favourable environment for trafficking. IOM staff operating 
at different points of the migration route, including on the 
EWISN and FMS implementation, increasingly came across 
reports of trafficking and exploitation. To address growing 
concerns about this phenomenon, a counter-trafficking 
survey was added to the FMS. 
Counter-trafficking surveys: gauging the extent of 
trafficking in mixed migration flows
Text message: IOM Skopje to IOM Belgrade (December 2015): 
No trains today. We got info on 460 migrants, however train 
has not been sent. Apparently they are waiting for at least 
600, to arrange transportation. 
Vulnerable migrants in Gevgelija, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, catching a train to the northern border with Serbia.
©Caroline Haga/IFRC
2 At the time of writing, 11,089 surveys had been conducted with migrants and 
refugees travelling through the Western Balkan route.
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3 Six questions in the counter-trafficking survey seek information on the 
respondent and whether they have during their journey: worked or performed 
activities without getting the payment they expected; been forced to perform 
work or activities against their will; been approached by someone offering 
employment; been approached by someone offering to arrange a marriage 
(for the respondent or someone in his or her family); been kept at a certain 
location against their will; or been aware of instances where migrants/
refugees en route had been approached by people offering cash in exchange 
for blood, organs or other body parts. 
Text message: Field Data Collector to IOM Skopje Counter 
Trafficking Focal Point (March 2016): There is a 16 year old 
girl from Nigeria in the last group and is traveling alone and 
with clear signs of distress. She declines to talk with male 
colleagues.
One significant difficulty facing Western Balkan countries 
affected by migrant and refugee movements was recognising 
and identifying trafficked or exploited people, or people 
potentially at risk. Given the short-term nature of migrants’ 
stays in many transit points, as well as reluctance among 
survivors or those at risk of trafficking to seek help and 
protection, identifying and addressing trafficking proved an 
immense challenge. Generally, there is a shortage of reliable, 
consistent and user-friendly primary data concerning many 
aspects of trafficking. 
During counter-trafficking surveys, IOM staff at transit points 
on the Western Balkan route note information on the presence 
of predatory behaviour, trafficking and other exploitative 
practices, ranging from forced or unpaid labour to captivity 
and offers of arranged marriage. Given that all surveys 
conducted by IOM are entirely anonymous, the aim is not to 
identify and refer trafficking survivors as such – though staff 
do have a standard procedure on how to handle situations 
where individuals come forward to report an incident. The 
findings of the counter-trafficking survey are intended to 
provide an indication of the likely prevalence of trafficking, 
and improved understanding of the circumstances in which 
human trafficking can occur.
The survey analysis and findings present clear and compelling 
evidence of predatory behaviour, including abuse, exploitation 
or practices which might amount to human trafficking. Based 
on collected data, out of 4,528 respondents surveyed, 6.5% 
answered ‘yes’ to at least one indicator of trafficking and 
exploitative practices, based on personal experience.3 An 
additional 1% of respondents said that, even though they had 
not directly experienced similar situations, a member of their 
family travelling with them had. Among the 4,528 respondents, 
0.5% said they knew of cases during their journey where 
someone had been offered cash in exchange for giving blood, 
organs or a body part. In the majority of cases, these people 
were friends or relatives of the respondents. 
Nationals from Afghanistan, Cameroon, Iraq, Pakistan and 
Syria had the highest percentages of positive responses to 
indicators of trafficking or other exploitative practices. Single 
people or people whose marital status was unknown, men, 
people travelling alone and young adults between 20 and 30 
years of age were more likely to answer ‘yes’ as well.
The results of the counter-trafficking surveys have led some 
of the countries along the route to examine existing indicators 
for identifying survivors of trafficking and exploitation. 
Consequently, new indicators have been developed that 
are better able to detect risks of predatory behaviour in the 
context of mass mixed migration flows.    
Ways forward
Text message: IOM Skopje to IOM Belgrade (March 2016): - 
This morning there’s no entry at the border. No news when 
people will be allowed to cross the border. There are 82 
people inside the center
The creation of an information-sharing network filled 
information gaps between national authorities, and among 
national authorities, local service providers and civil society 
organisations. The surveys deepened understanding of the 
factors determining these flows and the profiles of the 
migrants and refugees who comprise them. The integration 
of a counter-trafficking module in the survey sets a positive 
example for humanitarian emergencies more generally, and 
forms a solid basis for future counter-trafficking programming 
in different humanitarian contexts. 
The work done in the Western Balkans is part of IOM’s on-
going effort to collect information on displacement in crises 
and emergencies. In 2014–15, 14 million displaced people 
were tracked worldwide through DTM. The breadth and 
depth of the collected data mean that IOM is in a unique 
position to correlate information in the country of origin 
with the information provided by the migrants surveyed en route.
Following the EU–Turkey deal in March 2016, flows in the Western 
Balkans have decreased significantly. Nevertheless, movements 
at borders are still closely followed by IOM staff as there is 
potential for the situation to change over time. Concurrently, IOM 
staff have refocused their efforts on the situation of stranded 
migrants by implementing a more in-depth Flow Monitoring 
Survey. Throughout 2016, IOM rolled out projects in the countries 
of origin of migrants and refugees in order to further understand 
the complex nature of mixed migration flows. 
Amelia Stoenescu, Ivona Zakoska, Daniel Szabo and Debora 
Gonzalez Tejero are Displacement Tracking Matrix support 
team members. This article has been drafted with the support 
of their Assistance to Vulnerable Migrants Unit colleagues. For 
more information on migration flows to Europe see: http://
Migration.iom.int/europe.
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Local, dynamic, flexible: healthcare provision in the refugee response
Gareth Walker
For Doctors of the World (DOTW) – also known as Médecins du 
Monde (MDM) – the response to the increase in refugee arrivals 
in Europe has effectively been a massive expansion of the work 
we already do with vulnerable people on the continent. As such, 
DOTW has seen refugees and migrants to Europe in our projects 
for many years. DOTW France has had a support and advocacy 
project in Calais for over a decade. However, as the number of 
people arriving in Europe started to rise significantly, the MDM 
network mobilised to support specific responses, in Greece 
especially (Lesvos, Chios, Piraeus, Athens, Idomeni and on ferries 
between islands and the mainland), in addition to starting new 
projects supporting local organisations or at registration centres 
in Serbia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), 
Croatia and Slovenia. Today, the response has grown to 18 sites 
in Greece, primary health support in Belgrade and on the Serbia/
Hungary border, partnerships with local organisations in Slovenia 
and Croatia, a growing medical support programme in Calabria, 
Italy, and mobile clinic or support operations in Calais, Dunkirk, 
Caen and Dieppe in France, and Oostende and Zeebrugge in 
Belgium. We are also seeing refugees in our clinics in Belgium, 
France, Germany and the UK. This article highlights some of the 
distinct but related lessons we have learnt from the response.
Health provision
Health needs among the refugees are not particularly remark-
able. However, our teams noted several observations in Greece 
and Calais. In Greece, roughly 36% of the patients seen were 
children, which correlates with estimates that one in three 
refugees arriving in Greece is under 18. Incomplete immunis-
ation, inadequate safeguarding, lack of health promotion and 
lack of health screening, for instance for congenital conditions, 
is a major concern for this group. The combination of incomplete 
immunisations and cramped living conditions results in 
susceptible refugees developing diseases such as measles 
and varicella (chicken pox), a particular threat given their high 
incidence in some regions of the European Union (EU). Measles 
immunisation is often seen as a high priority in refugee settings 
due to the potential for immune-related complications such as 
pneumonia and diarrhoea. However, in this instance it took a 
long time for this to be organised, eventually being carried out 
largely by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), but also by state and 
other non-state actors.
It is worth considering why it took so long for vaccination to 
become a clear health action. The first, clear reason is that, 
until the EU–Turkey deal, we did not have the static population 
that would normally trigger a vaccination campaign due to the 
threat of outbreaks. However, we did have camp conditions 
where diseases would be present. Second, it is difficult to 
immunise a mobile population properly as coverage rates are 
difficult to confirm and double immunisations likely. However, 
without a static population and the risk of outbreak, it can be 
considered irrelevant to base operations on considerations 
of coverage. We are not vaccinating against an outbreak, but 
providing the individual with protection. 
The most notable difficulty in health provision has been mental 
health support. The need for it is clear – not only are people 
leaving situations of extreme threat and the possibility of 
trauma, but the journey itself is full of stress and trauma. The 
ability to treat mental health problems is severely hampered by 
ongoing, uncertain movement. Incomplete or partial treatment 
could also risk causing further harm. Since the implementation 
of the EU–Turkey deal, in Greece and, for a longer period, in 
Calais, we have seen more profound issues as a result of the 
journey being halted, with an increase in aggressive behaviour, 
depression and suicide attempts. It is entirely predictable that, 
once people’s journey has been stopped, they lose hope unless 
they are engaged in some other form of action for their benefit. 
The slow process of asylum in Greece has led to feelings of 
frustration and powerlessness, while the conditions of camp 
life lead to boredom and loss of agency. Many organisations in 
Greece are now offering psychosocial interventions, including 
group discussions, art therapy and counselling, along with 
significant efforts by Internews especially to try to address some 
of the causes of frustration through better communication with 
and from camp residents. However, this is still a massive gap 
in the response, with wide-ranging implications for the asylum 
process and, if asylum applications are successful, for how well 
people are able to adjust to their new conditions. 
Irrespective of the route taken, deprivation during the 
journey, poor living conditions and lack of adequate hygiene 
have increased vulnerability to respiratory conditions, 
gastrointestinal illness and skin diseases. Unsurprisingly, 
DOTW data from Northern France, the last barrier for many, 
shows that around 63% of health problems were related to 
living conditions and almost a quarter were musculoskeletal 
injuries. This is of course most concerning for patient groups 
with particular vulnerabilities – children, pregnant women, the 
disabled and those with existing conditions such as diabetes 
or other non-communicable diseases. Lack of access to, or 
perceived time to access, healthcare will result in increased 
morbidity and mortality. However, more also needs to be 
done to call on states to address terrible living conditions, in 
Northern France especially.
The value of local knowledge and presence
DOTW has run operations in Greece for the last 25 years and 
manages a network of five polyclinics across the country (in 
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Athens, Perama, Thessaloniki, Chania and Patras). These are 
primarily for the local vulnerable Greek population, but all 
are welcome, and services are free. The polyclinics operate 
with volunteer doctors of different specialties (internists, 
paediatricians, surgeons, gynaecologists, dermatologists, 
cardiologists, ophthalmologists, orthopaedic surgeons, radio-
logists, pulmonologists, ENT, psychiatrists, neurologists), 
nurses, psychologists and social workers. DOTW Greece also 
runs social programmes, mobile clinics and research projects. 
The response to the increasing numbers of refugees arriving in 
Greece therefore grew from a well-established operation, and 
has been able to gain access to situations that other, larger 
INGOs could not through established relationships with local 
authorities or government ministries.
Having this backbone of polyclinics and established networks 
within the Greek medical community also allowed flexibility. 
Existing relationships with secondary care facilities and staff 
meant that DOTW was able to expedite referrals despite the 
need for translation and a lack of resources in the health 
system. As DOTW needed to scale up its work, our reputation 
locally made it easier to identify staff who also knew what 
DOTW did and the way that we work. This meant that we 
were able to recruit effective, inducted and informed teams 
quickly as temporary concentrations of people developed, 
particularly in Athens. The vast majority of staff, clinical and 
non-clinical, are Greek volunteers. 
In Calais and Dunkirk the challenges were different. Our long-
term programme there has involved assisting vulnerable 
people, often migrants or refugees, to obtain health care within 
the French national system. Our presence increased from a 
small team of seven or eight to over 40 volunteers as the Calais 
camp grew. Our services also developed to include running 
a clinic providing primary health care and referral support 
along with psychosocial assistance and information and 
cultural advice. Surge support was provided by volunteers from 
France and the UK. As in Greece, DOTW was able to negotiate 
access and action with local authorities where some larger 
INGOs could not because of the long-standing relationships it 
had established. However, it should be noted that we did not 
protect this relationship at the cost of access: following severe 
vandalism and destruction of our clinics by suspected far right 
groups, DOTW changed tack and successfully pursued legal 
action against the French authorities for failing to provide basic 
services to refugees and migrants. Winning this legal battle has 
been instrumental in improving basic conditions in Calais. 
Dignity
One of the worst aspects of the situation in Europe has been 
the systematic dehumanising of the refugee population. 
This has manifested itself in many ways, most noticeably in 
politicians’ talk of ‘swarms’ and the development of policies 
that are designed to offer help, but only in distant places (with 
Volunteer doctors for Doctors of the World treat refugees in Lesvos, Greece.
©Kristof Vadino
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notable exceptions). In on the ground operations this can 
manifest itself in different ways. For DOTW, one noticeable issue 
has been the use of face masks and protective overalls. It has 
been our experience that many actors in Europe feel the need 
to protect themselves from a perceived risk of contamination. 
We have seen this on rescue boats in the Mediterranean and 
in registration facilities all along the Balkan route. This is 
an entirely unnecessary precaution, but one that strongly 
contributes to the narrative of ‘them and us’: a separation based 
on negative imagery of infection or contagion, that refugees are 
not people like us and that we need to take precautions, even 
when ‘helping’ them. (In fact, the risk is probably the reverse 
– refugees risk contracting vaccine-preventable diseases 
that the local population is immune to.) Quite apart from the 
effect on the public perception of refugees that media images 
present, DOTW is also very concerned about the psychological 
effect that presenting assistance in this form can have on the 
refugees themselves. Encouragingly, we were able to change 
this practice on a local level in Slovenia, where local health 
staff agreed to abandon face masks. We would encourage all 
humanitarian agencies to be vigilant for small actions such as 
this, in addition to higher-level policy advocacy. 
Keep moving, at all costs
Most refugee or IDP responses tend to be mounted in places 
where the population will remain, or at least stop for a 
reasonable period. One of the major challenges when working 
with refugees along the Balkan route, at least until the change 
in circumstances brought about by the European Union 
(EU)–Turkey deal in March, was that agencies were trying to 
intervene while people were still on the move. 
Trying to assist people while they are on the move makes 
provision of services difficult for several reasons. From a health 
perspective, it makes continuity of care virtually impossible 
because the primary concern for refugees is to keep moving 
and there is no time for follow-up appointments or referrals. 
This has resulted in people walking out of consultations if 
they receive a message that a border may open, or people 
missing follow-up appointments. More seriously, we have also 
seen situations where parents would not allow a child to be 
referred to hospital, as the opportunity cost of spending time 
in hospital is perceived to be too high. This is not to imply that 
people are ignorant of the importance of healthcare; indeed, 
refugees have repeatedly told us how much they value it. The 
point is that it is less important than completing the journey. 
This is also apparent when you consider the other risks to life 
that people have been willing to accept, from being smuggled 
across the Mediterranean to hanging on to the bottom of 
trucks in Calais. 
DOTW responded to this problem by analysing people’s 
situation at different points along their journey. Although the 
context was always changeable, we searched for particular 
times when refugees considered themselves at rest, and 
with no need to move. Finding these periods would allow 
refugees to engage with a service more, enabling us to deliver 
a more compassionate response of higher quality. Rather than 
expecting that refugees would avail themselves of services at 
the cost of their onward movement, this approach changed 
the way we considered where services should be established.
However, the list of suitable intervention points under these 
criteria was startlingly short. Even when going through 
registration processes or waiting for transport, refugees 
were constantly looking for any opportunity to move on. One 
intervention point that DOTW did identify was the ferry journey 
between the Greek islands and the mainland. Despite only 
being an overnight trip, providing services to people on the 
ferries was more effective, and provided a markedly different 
environment in which to manage both clinical and psychosocial 
consultations. Catching people when they were at rest, and 
providing services to them in this state of mind, allowed a 
measure of dignity in the process that other sites would not 
have made possible. Individual interaction was much easier, 
and people were more willing to open up. Providing time to 
talk about problems resulted in greater awareness of chronic 
conditions and the impact of lack of access to primary health 
care, along with getting an idea of people’s mental state. 
Contrast this with the situation many hundreds of miles away, 
in Calais and Dunkirk. Here, we repeatedly see people who have 
not moved for months, but are very resistant to anything that 
may tie them down for any time at all, including hospitalisation 
for severe conditions. We manage to refer patients for injuries 
that will prevent them from moving on, such as a broken leg, 
but face refusal for potentially more serious conditions that 
are not immediately so debilitating. Despite being in a position 
where they have not moved for months, we repeatedly see 
evidence that taking time to address health needs which could 
cost an opportunity to move on is a risk people are not willing 
to take. Opportunity costs count for this population.
Gareth Walker is International Programme Manager at 
Doctors of the World UK.
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The humanitarian impulse: alive and well among the citizens of Europe
John Borton
In December 2015, a British firefighter was volunteering on 
the Greek island of Lesvos  with the Swedish volunteer group 
Lighthouse Relief, operating a search and rescue and medical 
services team based at Korakas lighthouse on the island’s north 
shore. Visiting Molyvos to buy medical supplies, he went to a 
restaurant to eat and found himself sitting next to a man wearing 
a Red Cross shirt. ‘Are you working for the Red Cross?’ he asked. 
‘Yes, I am.’ ‘Well, where are all the rest of you?’ asked the volunteer. 
‘We don’t need more of us here because you volunteers are doing 
such a good job’ came the reply. Even if meant to be humorous, 
the reply contained a telling truth, for a remarkable feature of 
the humanitarian response to the movement of refugees and 
vulnerable migrants in Europe has been the scale and range of 
the response by volunteers and civil society groups. 
Greek fishermen have rescued or assisted thousands of 
refugees and vulnerable migrants travelling in overloaded 
and unseaworthy boats and inflatable dinghies. Local people 
in Greece, Italy, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM), Serbia, Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia and other countries 
along the main transit routes have provided water, food, shelter, 
shoes, clothing and other forms of assistance to people walking 
past their homes or gathered in their hundreds at railway 
stations in Budapest, Vienna,  Hamburg and other cities. Across 
Europe, tens of thousands of people have contributed their 
time to collect and sort donated clothes and shoes, load and 
despatch trucks and organise fundraising events. Thousands 
have taken extended breaks from their jobs to work in search 
and rescue teams, manage transit camps, run field kitchens, 
provide legal advice and offer accommodation and support to 
refugees and asylum-seekers.
Based on private research, including interviews with ten selec-
ted volunteers, this article provides a preliminary indication 
of the scale and characteristics of the volunteer response, 
identifies the events and motivations that contributed to it 
and briefly reflects on the ‘volunteer phenomenon’ and its 
potential implications for humanitarian action. 
Assessing the scale of the overall volunteer 
response
A Provisional Inventory compiled as part of the research for this 
article has identified 216 volunteer groups across Europe as 
having participated in, or contributed to, the response. Of these, 
180 were formed during 2015 or early 2016. This list, drawn from 
the Inventory, is indicative of the range of groups involved:
• Berlin Refugee Help: providing support to arriving 
refugees including language phrasebooks for use by 
refugees and by German volunteers.
• Bezirk Jennersdorf – Flüchtlingshilfe: an Austrian 
group coordinating aid to refugees at Jennersdorf near 
Austria’s border with Hungary.
• Dirty Girls of Lesvos: providing industrial-scale laundry 
services for refugees (blankets, bedding etc.) on Lesvos 
and mainland Greece.
• East Midlands Solidarity: a British group (with subgroups 
in Derbyshire, Leicester and Nottingham) providing 
clothes, supplies and funding to refugees and vulnerable 
migrants in northern France, Greece and Syria. 
• Information Point for Refugee Legal Information Volun-
teers: an information-sharing forum for lawyers and 
legally trained volunteers providing legal services to 
refugees.
• ProActiva Open Arms: a Barcelona-based group that 
provided search and rescue services around Lesvos in 
2015, and is in the process of expanding its work to the 
central Mediterranean.
• Rastplatz Project: a Swiss group providing food and 
general support to refugees along the Balkans route; it 
also runs the main food kitchen in Dunkirk.
• Refugee Rights Data Project (RRDP): a UK-based group 
undertaking censuses and surveys to support policy-
making, starting with a major survey in Calais in 
February 2016.
• Sitchting Bootvluchteling/Boat Refugee Foundation: 
a Dutch group providing search and rescue services, 
supplies and a medical mission on Lesvos, Leros, Kos 
and Samos, and in Athens and on the Greek mainland.
• Urgence Réfugiés Calais, Lille et environs: collecting 
material donations (food, clothing, building materials, 
fire extinguishers, carpets) as well as funds for refugees 
in Calais, Dunkirk and Lille.
It is a common, if rather crude, practice within the humani-
tarian sector to gauge the size and scale of a humanitarian 
programme or organisation by its overall budget and staff 
numbers. However, for most of the groups listed in the 
Provisional Inventory such measures are not meaningful. 
Even where expenditure data is readily available, most of the 
goods and services provided are privately donated and so 
do not have a measured monetary value. Volunteers give 
their time gratis, either funding themselves or through 
crowdfunding sites such as GoFundMe, JustGiving and 
MyDonate. Moreover, actual time inputs vary widely – 
from evening and weekend contributions by home-based 
volunteers to full-time contributions of 12 months or more 
in directly operational roles in other countries. Whilst 
sorting clothes and loading trucks are essentially low-skilled 
tasks, a significant number of doctors, lawyers, logisticians, 
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accountants and other professionals have contributed their 
specialist skills to volunteer groups. 
Events and motivations contributing to the 
scale of the volunteer response
Against the backdrop of growing numbers of refugees and 
vulnerable migrants arriving in Europe through 2015, and the 
associated media coverage, especially from July onwards, 
particular events stimulated the interest of those who became 
volunteers and spurred them into action.
The most influential event was undoubtedly the publication 
and global dissemination of images of three-year-old Alan 
Kurdi, whose body was washed ashore on 2 September near 
Bodrum in Turkey following the sinking of the dinghy in which 
his family were trying to cross to the Greek island of Kos. It is 
no coincidence that many groups in the Provisional Inventory 
were set up during September 2015. Some volunteers also refer 
to the earlier drowning of over 1,200 migrants and refugees in 
the central Mediterranean in a single week in April 2015.
As well as such tragic events, it appears that the use of 
pejorative terms by politicians also spurred people into taking 
voluntary action. On 30 July, when asked about the refugee and 
migrant situation in Calais, which was causing travel delays for 
British tourists, British Prime Minister David Cameron spoke 
of a ‘swarm’ of people wanting to come to the UK. Over the 
following 24 hours the Facebook group Calais People to People 
Solidarity – Action from the UK increased its followers from 
around 100 to 600. According to the administrator of the group, 
‘David Cameron was responsible for an explosion of interest by 
British people wanting to help the camp residents in Calais’. 
Also apparent from the testimonies of volunteers is the critical 
role of social media in facilitating and expanding the volunteer 
response. Immediately following Cameron’s ‘swarms’ comment, 
a young English woman, Jaz O’Hara, her brother and two friends 
living in Tunbridge, Kent, decided to drive an hour and a half to 
Calais to see the refugee and migrant camp for themselves. At 
that point Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and Médecins du 
Monde (MDM) were providing limited medical services to camp 
residents, and a very small number of volunteer groups were 
struggling to provide other forms of assistance. Conditions 
were appalling, but Jaz and her friends were given a hospitable 
welcome by camp residents. Returning home they established 
CalAid, a grassroots group providing food and clothing to the 
camp. Jaz wrote an informative, passionate Facebook post to 
her friends on 6 August that went viral and, in the space of just a 
few days, was shared over 60,000 times. Within days, vanloads 
of clothes had been donated and £132,000 raised – some of 
which was used by her brother to make a documentary film of 
the camp. Subsequently the group formed another grassroots 
organisation, The WorldWide Tribe, to raise awareness of 
migration and displacement issues. 
Depot for donated material for refugees at Röszke, Hungary, set up UNHCR and staffed by volunteers.
©UNHCR/Mark Henley
Humanitarian Exchange   Number 67   September 2016    |    25
A similar story was repeated in London towards the end of 
August when three well-connected friends, Lliana Bird (a DJ 
with Radio X), Dawn O’Porter (a writer and TV presenter) and 
Josie Naughton (a former manager with the band Coldplay), 
launched a social media campaign #helpcalais to raise funds 
and collect goods to take to Calais on a truck scheduled to 
depart on 17 September. The public response was huge and, 
following the death of Alan Kurdi, became overwhelming. 
Soon #helpcalais became Help Refugees. As well as sending 
several trucks to Calais, Help Refugees helped lead efforts 
to improve the logistical operations of the volunteer groups 
working in Calais and replace tents in the camp with insulated 
shelters, and began supporting volunteer groups in Idomeni, 
Lesvos and other Greek islands. The founders’ connections, 
combined with innovative approaches to donations using 
online purchasing of pre-selected goods (sleeping bags, 
jackets, shoes) provided by a commercial company, which 
then delivers directly to the warehouse in Calais, has enabled 
Help Refugees to raise over £2 million in funding and provide 
£1m of new donated goods. The group has also provided 
significant funding and support to other volunteer groups 
working in France and Greece, including MDM.
Such spontaneous outpourings of voluntary humanitarian 
action took place across Europe. At the end of August 2015 
in Zagreb, Croatia, a musician and his wife, Luka and Lejla 
Juranica, were moved by TV news coverage showing refugees 
and vulnerable migrants crossing into Croatia from Hungary at 
Roszke. They collected food and other items and, with a group 
of friends, drove to the border crossing, where the only support 
being provided was in the form of medical services from MSF. 
Returning to Zagreb they organised a concert called ‘Are You 
Syrious?’ – a name that was subsequently adopted for their 
grassroots organisation. Using money from the concert they 
took a truck with enough food for 4,000 people to Tovarnik, 
another entry point to Croatia from Hungary. Subsequently 
they established a supply station between Bapska on the 
border with Serbia and the camp set up by the Croatian 
authorities 17km away at Opatovac. No agencies were present 
at Bapska at that point. At the height of the flows 7,000 people 
a day were crossing the border.1 
The absence, or at the very least perceived absence, of other 
humanitarian actors was an important motivating force for 
many volunteers and voluntary groups. In early September 
Gabriela Andreevska, who was organising the purchase and 
distribution of water and food in the small town of Gevgelija 
in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) (just 
across the border from the Greek town of Idomeni), stated 
her motivations clearly: ‘I am doing this work because I 
have never been close to so many people sleeping rough in 
the streets on cold concrete – pregnant women and babies 
and sick old men – and nobody is helping them!’2 In a similar 
vein the website of UK Action for Refugees, a grassroots 
organisation set up in 2015, states:
We began as a group of like-minded individuals who 
realised that the governments and main NGOs seemed 
unable to respond to a humanitarian crisis that was 
happening in their own backyard. What we could never 
have imagined was that there were thousands of other 
people who felt exactly the same way, disempowered and 
desperate to help, but unable to figure out how. Through 
the power of social media we reached out and they 
reached back, and through our combined efforts we have 
been able to become an organisation that can and does 
make a difference.3 
Some initial reflections
Faced with a dramatic increase in the number of refugees and 
vulnerable migrants arriving and transiting Europe during 
2015 and early 2016, national authorities were either reluctant 
to respond or struggled to do so in ways that were timely, 
effective and comprehensive. The formal humanitarian 
system also struggled to operate effectively in a context 
that was legally, politically and operationally challenging. 
Consequently, there were significant gaps in humanitarian 
provision which in many areas were met, or at least partially 
met, by a remarkable outpouring of humanitarian support 
by volunteers and civil society groups. Even now, several 
months after the March 2016 EU–Turkey deal sharply reduced 
the flow of refugees and vulnerable migrants through Greece 
and the Balkans, volunteer groups continue to provide a wide 
range of services in many European countries.  
Social media, notably Facebook, and free messaging services 
such as WhatsApp played a critical role in facilitating the 
‘volunteer phenomenon’, enabling individual volunteers to 
link up with each other and form effective groups. These ‘new’ 
media also allowed volunteer groups to receive information 
from representatives on the ground and, coupled with their 
flexible, trust-based funding arrangements, enabled them to 
adapt rapidly to changing conditions and needs. 
Much more study is needed to objectively assess the scale 
of the contribution and benefits provided by this ‘volunteer 
phenomenon’. Such research would help answer questions 
around the quality of services provided by volunteers, the 
effectiveness of their ad hoc but often creative coordination 
mechanisms, their ability to adequately safeguard children 
and vulnerable people in their care, the degree of  protection 
afforded to refugees and migrants through the volunteer 
groups’ on-the-ground, round-the-clock presence, and the 
1 Nathan Miller, ‘The Story of “Are You Syrious?” a Refugees Aid Organisation’, 
23 November 2015, http://nathanmiller.co/the-story-of-are-you-syrious-a-
refugees-aid-organisation-3/#sthash.kuuYBYJ5.dpbs.
2 ‘One Woman’s Strength Is Helping Refugees in Macedonia’, Al 
Jazeera English, 8 September 2015, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=V79iNNmBJe8. 
3 See http://www.ukactionforrefugees.com/about-us.
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effectiveness of the working relationships between volun-
teer groups and international humanitarian agencies. Never-
theless, even before more detailed study is undertaken, it 
is patently clear that, in the absence of such an outpouring 
of popular humanitarian action, many more refugees and 
vulnerable migrants would have died in the Mediterranean 
and Aegean, on the overland routes through Greece and the 
Balkans and in the unregistered camps in Calais, Dunkirk and 
other areas of Europe. Clearly, the humanitarian impulse is still 
alive and well in Europe.
John Borton is a Senior Research Associate with the 
Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at ODI. Between November 
2015 and June 2016 he undertook self-funded research on the 
humanitarian response to the refugee and migrant flows in 
Europe.
The Starfish Foundation: a local response to a global crisis 
Emma Eggink and Melinda McRostie 
Of the 500,000 refugees and vulnerable migrants who transited 
through Lesvos in 2015, over 200,000 passed through the small 
town of Molyvos. I arrived in Molyvos in July 2015 to take part in 
a summer school at the University of the Aegean, which is based 
on Lesvos, and became involved with the grassroots volunteer 
initiative providing assistance to arriving refugees that three 
months later was formally established as the Starfish Foundation. 
Faced with a delayed and patchy response by the government 
and professional humanitarian agencies, coupled with resistance 
among sections of the local community to the idea of supporting 
the refugees, local and international volunteers decided to take 
the provision of relief into their own hands.
The early days of a local response
The collective of volunteers from which the Starfish Foundation 
was established began to form in the summer of 2010, when 
small numbers of refugees and vulnerable migrants, mainly from 
Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, began arriving on Lesvos. The group 
consisted of a variety of people from Molyvos, including shop and 
restaurant owners, pensioners and teachers. They came together 
at irregular intervals to provide assistance to refugees arriving 
either on the shores in small boats and rubber dinghies, or brought 
into Molyvos harbour by the Greek coastguard.
Molyvos is a small town with a year-round population of about 
1,000. It lies on the north coast of Lesvos, just six miles from 
Turkey. The coastguard office responsible for the northern 
coast is situated in Molyvos, which meant that refugee boats 
intercepted by its patrol vessels were usually brought into 
Molyvos’ picturesque harbour, alongside some of the busiest 
restaurants in this popular tourist town. Like the rest of Greece, 
Molyvos had suffered a severe economic downturn and there 
were no funds available for the coastguard, police or municipality 
to put in place formal structures to receive the sporadic refugee 
arrivals. Hence, as was the case on other Greek islands, locals 
provided assistance each time a boat was brought in.
In early 2015, an increase in the number of refugees arriving 
in Molyvos prompted the volunteers to start operating a more 
fixed structure: using a schedule, having set shifts and renting 
storage space close to the harbour, where sandwiches were 
made and emergency supplies stored. This more fixed group 
operated from a restaurant in the harbour owned by the 
Starfish Foundation’s current director, Melinda McRostie, and 
her husband Theo Kosmetos. 
By the spring, what had been a quiet phenomenon that local 
volunteers had been fairly successfully addressing escalated into 
a crisis that was extremely disruptive to a municipality dependent 
on tourism, and with no formal structures in place to deal with 
the situation. In particular, it became apparent that a reception 
site would be necessary to receive people in a fair and dignified 
way. Refugees were arriving mainly in the north of the island, and 
the lack of a central site and local law forbidding the transport 
of non-registered refugees to the official registration location in 
the south of the island meant that large numbers of people had 
to make their way on foot. There was only one location along the 
route where people could find shelter, run by the local charity 
Aggalia. The German NGO Borderline Europe proposed setting 
up a reception facility in the north of the island, but when this 
proposal met with fierce local resistance the Molyvos volunteer 
group took matters into their own hands, renting a small plot of 
land next to the harbour where they established a small transit 
site where people rescued by the coastguard could wait for a bus 
to take them to the registration site. 
Responding to an evolving crisis
In August 2015 the number of people arriving in Lesvos 
increased substantially. In less than two weeks, the number of 
arrivals passing through Molyvos daily went from about 150 to 
around 1,000. However, the relief effort was not coordinated 
and there were still no formal provisions in place to receive 
people and transport them to the south. After protests from 
islanders, the law was changed in June to allow private 
individuals and a handful of buses, run first by MSF and then the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), to transport non-
registered migrants from a car park in Molyvos. It was, however, 
evident that more needed to be done. As international NGOs 
were not providing an adequate response, volunteer groups 
assumed greater responsibility. On the beaches, volunteers 
Humanitarian Exchange   Number 67   September 2016    |    27
were coordinated by local resident Eric Kempson and his 
family. From there, refugees walked to the car park in Molyvos, 
before travelling on to the registration centre in the south of 
the island. Increasingly, tourists and international volunteers 
started helping the local volunteer team by providing clothes 
and water, and ensuring that the few available buses were 
loaded peacefully. For some local volunteers, the coordination 
and logistics involved in providing food and other supplies and 
arranging for sufficient buses to transport people arriving in the 
car park was becoming a full-time occupation. 
Despite the fact that the majority of refugees were arriving in the 
north, NGO activities were concentrated in the camps at Moria 
and Kara Tepe in the south of the island. In part this was down to 
local resistance: whereas in the south the mayor had welcomed 
the help offered by international organisations, in Molyvos 
the creation of a semi-permanent transit site for refugees was 
opposed by members of the local community, who feared that it 
would attract more people and develop into a permanent camp. 
There was particular concern that Molyvos might become one of 
the ‘hotspots’ the European Union (EU) was considering setting 
up. Limited access to information (including in Greek) from the 
media and organisations such as UNHCR was a key factor in 
fuelling suspicion and fear.
Becoming humanitarians
Towards the end of August, tensions in the town led to a 
vote by the local council to close off the car park where the 
refugees were gathering, leaving the volunteer team without 
a site to distribute relief items and load refugees onto buses. 
Refugees were stuck at the entrance to the town, with no 
shelter, little assistance and no transport. Although the 
International Rescue Committee (IRC) came to an agreement 
with the Tourism Association and the Molyvos Municipality 
that allowed it to open a camp along a rather inaccessible 
road far from any villages, local volunteers recognised that 
a short-term solution for the reception of refugees was 
urgently needed. 
In mid-September, the owner of the OXY nightclub agreed 
that the team could use his car park. A few gazebos were 
put up and IRC started running more buses in the large 
space now available. Over the following three and a half 
months, between mid-September and Christmas, at least 
150,000 refugees passed through OXY. When daily arrivals 
started exceeding 3,000 in late September, we were unable 
to load everyone for transport to the south of the island 
during daylight hours, and OXY became an overnight camp. 
The site was designed and run entirely by volunteers from 
the Starfish team, with site managers and rotating teams 
responsible for a ticketing system, crowd control, loading 
buses, the distribution of food and clothes, logistics between 
warehouses and the site and the scheduling and training of 
volunteers. In late October some 85 trained volunteers were 
working on our team. Some of the refugees passing through 
the site also helped out, or even returned after obtaining 
their registration papers in the south of the island.
Volunteer assisting with the registration of refugees rescued by the coast guard in Lesvos, Greece.
©Marcus Q Rhinelander
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At OXY we learned what it meant to work as humanitarians. 
The absence of formal government or UNHCR reception sites 
and the arrival of more international NGOs on the island during 
September meant that many organisations were willing to 
provide relief, yet could not set up something sustainable. The 
OXY site provided a space in which they were able to offer their 
services. Soon after OXY opened, the French NGO Women and 
Health Alliance International (WAHA) began providing medical 
services, and UNHCR provided us with our first big rub hall, able 
to accommodate 200 people. IRC provided buses and protection 
staff for the site. The increasing number of volunteers and partner 
organisations working at OXY meant that the site became more 
difficult to manage for a small and rapidly evolving team that still 
consisted entirely of people with no previous camp management 
experience. We had to learn quickly on the job, while managing 
the response to a crisis that was becoming more severe every 
day. On the plus side, we were able to respond quickly and 
dynamically as we were not weighed down by bureaucracy. 
From practical experience the team realised that, to continue to 
respond to the accelerating crisis, we needed to professionalise 
further. Our efforts relied entirely on donations from tourists and 
volunteers, who brought clothes and groceries or left money at 
local supermarkets and pharmacies to pay our ever-increasing 
bills. To continue our work, it became necessary to set up a 
legal foundation and a bank account so that we could accept 
donations from abroad. We also started providing salaries to 
build capacity and retain those volunteers who had taken on 
responsibility for managing funds, media work and managing 
other volunteers. In mid-October, the Starfish Foundation was 
officially established as a non-profit organisation.1 
As a young organisation we benefited from the guidance of 
established NGOs. Some offered training on frameworks and 
principles in the humanitarian sector, psychosocial support 
and field security. The Danish Red Cross provided training for 
the board and psychological support for volunteers, and helped 
us to create a phased plan for the physical development of the 
OXY site and manage the increasing number of NGOs working 
at the site. Other invaluable support from humanitarians and 
other professionals included guidance on grant writing and the 
development of evaluation procedures and simple reporting 
systems to feed back to donors and supporters.
At times there was friction between professionals and volun-
teers, mainly arising, I believe, from the tension between 
volunteers’ eagerness to respond to needs rapidly, while 
professionals worked on setting up systems that would enable 
an efficient response in the long term. Among volunteers, I 
sometimes sensed dissatisfaction with criticism of their work 
from the professionals, who sometimes failed to recognise that 
the systems in place were born in the midst of a crisis, and had 
developed precisely because the large NGOs had been absent. 
To ensure that we all had the same aims and perspectives, 
we obliged everyone working at the site, whether volunteers 
or seasoned humanitarian workers, to attend our induction 
session. Many people, but not all, recognised that it was useful 
to become familiar with our philosophy and working systems, 
the design of the site and the people working on our team.
Future outlook
By Christmas 2015 the influx of refugees had decreased drastically. 
As the OXY site was only intended as a temporary expedient, and 
the IRC had since opened Apanemo camp close to Molyvos, the 
team decided that it was time to hand over responsibility for the 
reception of refugees and start closing OXY down. In the months 
that followed, our volunteer team worked in various locations on 
the island, including Moria camp and several reception facilities 
for unaccompanied minors. The changing situation and the 
uncertainty surrounding the EU–Turkey deal, under which all new 
arrivals are detained and processed in closed camps managed by 
the Greek government, have required us to be extremely flexible 
and to think hard about our mission and our future. The core team 
has discussed in depth whether we should shift our long-term 
focus to evolving needs in education, psychosocial support and 
legal assistance, both here and on the mainland. Our organisation 
was, however, born out of a local need. The team was stepping in 
to address an urgent situation unfolding on our doorstep. Now, 
as the situation in northern Lesvos is no longer urgent, we have 
decided to return to our initial intent. Starfish will continue to 
operate on a much smaller scale, focusing mainly on rebuilding 
the local community, which has lost its main source of income 
following a significant drop-off in tourism. We are still supporting 
various camps with food and clothes. 
The Starfish Foundation is an example of a ‘pop-up’ grassroots 
relief phenomenon. Organisations like ours can perform 
functions that NGOs have to spend longer deliberating on. 
Strengthened by our knowledge of the local context, we were 
able to respond much more rapidly and effectively to needs 
as they arose. The potential of grassroots organisations in 
emergency response can be stimulated, supported and guided 
by NGOs. When this is done adequately – with clear information 
and lines of communication with the local community and local 
organisations, and a willingness to protect local livelihoods 
and foster relations with those within the local community who 
know how to navigate sensitive local issues – the potential of 
grassroots organisations is huge. In fact, many former members 
of our own volunteer team have used the experience they 
gained in Lesvos to continue to work elsewhere in the refugee 
response, either professionally or with other volunteer teams.
Emma Eggink helped found the Starfish Foundation, for which 
she has been working as a volunteer and then as a Programme 
Manager since July 2015. Special thanks to Melinda McRostie 
and Elena Michael for their extensive input and insightful 
remarks during the drafting of this article.
1 The official legal form of the Starfish Foundation is known in Greek as 
ΑΣΤΙΚΗ ΜΗ ΚΕΡΔΟΣΚΟΠΙΚΗ ΕΤΑΙΡΕΙΑ (ΑΜΚΕ), which translates as 
‘non-profit organisation’, requiring a board and statutes.
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National volunteers in an international crisis: the view from the inside 
Kate Latimir 
Volunteers have been at the heart of the migration response in 
Greece. They are often the first faces seen by refugees on Greece’s 
beaches, and a reassuring presence delivering food parcels, 
health care, psychosocial support and family tracing services in 
temporary camps, informal settlements and detention centres. 
They are being drained emotionally, physically and personally, 
yet they remain dedicated to supporting these vulnerable 
people. 
The Hellenic Red Cross (HRC) and its network of over 1,000 
volunteers has been at the forefront of the refugee crisis in 
Europe, working tirelessly to ensure access to services and 
support for hundreds of thousands of migrants in and around 
Northern Greece, the islands (Lesvos, Kos, Samos, Chios, Rhodes, 
Crete) and Attica. The experience of Red Cross volunteers offers 
an excellent example of local people mobilising in response to a 
humanitarian crisis unfolding before them.
The extraordinary response of international volunteers in 
this crisis has rightly received much coverage. Yet research 
and policy focused on the crisis has yet to engage with the 
experiences of local volunteers. Understanding the complex 
motivations and specific needs of local volunteers and how 
they can best be supported is crucial to sustaining the response 
in the long term, and ensuring positive relations between 
Greeks and refugees. It also provides an interesting example 
of national humanitarian action, albeit in a developed context. 
As such, a number of interviews and focus group discussions 
were held by the British Red Cross with HRC volunteers in 
late May 2016, exploring the challenges they face and their 
reflections on the response to date.  
National humanitarian action
‘We had seen scenes like this on the TV, but nothing prepares 
you for the reality … the mission is now in our country’ 
(Vagelis, HRC volunteer, Thessaloniki)
Volunteer action has been part of the Red Cross/Red Crescent 
Movement for over 150 years and is one of the seven fundamental 
principles that bind the National Societies, the International 
Committee and the Federation. The 1,000-strong HRC volunteer 
workforce carry out their specific roles – which range from search 
and rescue to first aid, family tracing support and social welfare – 
on a part-time basis. Many are retired or unemployed, whilst others 
combine their volunteer role with paid work. Unlike the profile of 
international volunteers involved in the refugee response, which 
tends to be young and mixed gender, often providing short-term 
assistance in-country, HRC volunteers are predominantly female, 
with the vast majority over the age of 40. Almost two-thirds have 
served in the organisation for over a decade. 
The injection of international funds for the response has enabled 
the National Society to expand its operations, workforce and 
volunteer numbers, particularly among university students 
and young people. Gabriel, a new volunteer recruit in Lesvos, 
explains: ‘Last August I was on the beach with a few friends 
trying to assist refugees who had just arrived, but we were not 
prepared or trained to deal with what confronted us. We were 
so relieved when we saw HRC volunteers coming to support us 
– from that day on I wanted to volunteer for the Red Cross’. Most 
volunteers are positive about this expansion, although for some 
long-standing volunteers, with ten or more years of service, the 
scale, pace and staff turnover characteristic of an international 
response has proved challenging. Many volunteers say they are 
aware of the existence of other humanitarian organisations, but 
have little interaction with them. Volunteers commented that 
their focus is necessarily on the specific task at hand, and they 
therefore have limited understanding of external coordination 
mechanisms or of the entirety of the response. 
Certainly, changes in the leadership and coordination of the 
international response are a problem for volunteers. In response 
to the refugee arrivals in Greece, the Red Cross Movement 
Hellenic Red Cross volunteers bring relief items to a reception centre on the 
island of Lesvos, Greece.
©Stephen Ryan/IFRC 
30    |  Refugees and vulnerable migrants in Europe
increased its support to the HRC, which included international 
emergency appeals for funding, deployment of emergency rosters 
to support WASH and health among other sectors, as well as the 
deployment of international staff to provide support in a range of 
areas, from cash-based responses to community engagement. As 
is typical in an international emergency response, the Red Cross 
Movement and other humanitarian agencies have experienced 
high turnover among staff brought in to coordinate and manage 
different elements of the response. Volunteers noted the 
difficulty in developing and maintaining relationships within the 
international humanitarian community as a result of this constant 
flux. Significantly, the arrival of international humanitarian aid 
workers in a developed context with high unemployment has left 
many Greek volunteers frustrated, particularly given the chaotic 
scenes that marked the initial stages of the response. 
Many national volunteers who have worked principally with 
their local communities have found it difficult to understand 
the specific needs and vulnerabilities of refugees and migrants 
with different cultural and religious backgrounds. Due to the 
spontaneous nature of the response and the need for rapid 
expansion, many volunteers received little practical training 
to prepare them for working with a number of different 
nationalities. A majority of the volunteers interviewed cited 
cultural sensitivity as their main challenge, having learnt much 
of what not to do through trial and error. As such, there have 
been numerous requests for training on the ethnic, religious 
and cultural backgrounds of refugees. 
In parallel, volunteers report receiving daily requests for 
information on asylum from migrants, and felt ineffectual 
if they were unable to provide advice or refer people to an 
appropriate service. Although the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) provides a short briefing in the initial 
stages of their training, many volunteers felt that they would 
benefit from a deeper understanding of referral mechanisms, 
indicating a clear desire to participate and coordinate more 
effectively in the overall humanitarian response.
Having worked in fire-fighting mode since the onset of the 
crisis, the volunteers have had little time to develop their 
knowledge of the wider context and skill set, which may make 
it harder for them to take a more active role if (or when) the 
international community exits. The longevity of the Red Cross 
volunteers’ engagement, as opposed to the temporary nature of 
international staff deployments and international volunteering, 
underscores the importance of supporting national volunteers 
to become more central to the response so that it can be 
sustained in what is now becoming a protracted crisis.
Volunteering: a bridge between different 
communities
‘We all live under the same sun … we need to appreciate 
the things we have in common’ (Pascalia, HRC volunteer in 
Lesvos)
A striking characteristic of the response has been the 
remarkable mobilisation of Greek voluntary organisations and 
individuals providing aid to migrants despite facing unprece-
dented levels of unemployment and poverty themselves. The 
HRC reports that applications to volunteer have increased by 
over a third since the start of the crisis, with 350 new recruits 
joining the organisation. Nevertheless, the HRC’s response to 
the crisis has at times been perceived to be to the detriment 
of vulnerable Greeks. Prior to the crisis, the HRC focused on 
supporting local communities and the elderly through social 
welfare programmes, first aid and emergency response to 
earthquakes and wildfires. A greater focus on support for 
‘outsiders’ has not always been welcome. As one HRC volun-
teer in Thessaloniki put it, people ‘don’t have much knowledge 
of the situation and assume that the refugees are carrying 
diseases and weapons … People are concerned’.
When asked how they deal with adverse reactions to migrants 
and their work, volunteers are quick to refer to a self-imposed 
responsibility beyond the delivery of services: that of providing 
a link between the migrants and their own communities. Many 
feel that their personal contact and experiences working 
with migrants have helped foster improved understanding 
and developed social cohesion. One 19-year-old Red Cross 
volunteer remarked: ‘I relate the stories I hear to my friends 
and family which helps build bridges and understanding. My 
experience has inspired others to volunteer and lessened the 
fear some people had of the refugees’. Volunteers’ efforts to ease 
anxiety and encourage relations between the host and migrant 
communities are recognised and promoted by the National 
Society. For example, HRC is currently exploring education 
campaigns in schools and universities as a way of encouraging a 
new generation into volunteerism and sensitising these groups 
on the situation of migrants in their country.
As the context shifts from the humanitarian needs of people 
on the move to the needs of people in camps and detention 
centres, the role of volunteers as advocates for migrants is 
becoming ever more important. Volunteers note that their 
communities are increasingly concerned about the long-
term nature of the crisis, with the fate of over 53,000 refugees 
entangled in the wider politics surrounding the deal between 
the European Union (EU) and Turkey1 as well as the wider 
socio-political crisis in Greece: ‘my neighbours are sceptical 
about the future – we are a poor country and there are not 
enough jobs. The majority want to help with what they can, 
but we are all uncertain about what the future holds – this 
situation is not sustainable’. The lack of proximity of local 
communities and migrants now confined to camps and 
detention centres, combined with the increased international 
funding being provided to address their long-term needs, will 
only serve to increase the distance between migrants and 
local communities, underlining the key role of volunteers in 
1 Under the deal, new migrants arriving in Greece who are found not to be in 
genuine need of asylum are returned to Turkey. In exchange, the EU will take a 
Syrian in Turkey who has been declared in need of asylum. 
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bridging this divide. Ultimately, it is clear that the humanity 
and solidarity expressed in the act of volunteering has a 
tangible impact on those receiving assistance, those providing 
it and society more broadly.
Volunteer support
‘There are volunteers who are unemployed and yet continue 
to volunteer … we see problems that are bigger than our 
own and we want to help’ (Dimitris, HRC volunteer, Athens)
In witnessing this crisis, many volunteers will experience 
significant trauma themselves. Factors such as support from 
field coordinators, access to adequate equipment and training, 
the types of roles being undertaken by volunteers (for example 
providing psychosocial support to migrants) and length of 
working hours were also cited as having a strong impact on 
mental wellbeing. It is therefore vital that we invest more in 
providing care and assisting in the recovery of volunteers to 
avoid burn-out and loss of capacity in the future.
This includes comparatively simple measures such as ensuring 
adequate funding for equipment and travel costs, or fostering a 
sense among volunteers that their organisation cares for their 
wellbeing. Due to the urgent nature of the migration response 
in its early phase, the HRC was initially unable to meet volunteer 
needs. However, with the change in context to a more static 
situation, greater efforts are being made to strengthen capacity 
across a variety of sectors, including psychosocial support, 
hygiene promotion and cash transfer programmes.  
The international community has arguably underestimated the 
contribution of Greek volunteers, including within the HRC. With 
more deliberation, investment and utilisation of their skills, 
the part that national volunteers are already playing could be 
extended and enhanced. Recognition and greater development 
of their vital role in bridging the divide between migrant and 
host communities is essential, particularly as the context 
changes from people on the move to people trapped in a 
country crippled by mass unemployment, a failing economy and 
an increasingly frustrated population. It is therefore crucial that 
capacity strengthening support and investment in volunteers 
and national organisations is made now. The HRC and its 
volunteers will continue to play a pivotal role in supporting both 
the local population and migrants, long after funding has dried 
up and the international community has moved on. 
Kate Latimir is Humanitarian Policy Adviser at the British 
Red Cross.
During 2016 more than 240,000 refugees and vulnerable 
migrants have arrived in Europe after crossing the Mediterran-
ean Sea. A further one million made the same journey in 2015.1 
For RedR staff, the parallels were striking: 35 years previously, 
Peter Guthrie’s experiences of working in a Malaysian refugee 
camp during the Vietnamese boat people crisis moved him 
to set up the organisation. Since then, RedR has worked to 
ensure that those responding to humanitarian crises have the 
skills to do so safely and effectively, by providing training and 
technical support to aid workers, NGOs and first responders 
all over the world.
How it started
The scale of new arrivals in Europe was met by an outpouring 
of public goodwill. In many cases this took the form of 
European volunteers taking practical steps to help. Where the 
formal humanitarian system was slow to respond to the crisis, 
these volunteers were able to launch their own responses to 
the situation. Emerging grassroots initiatives in the UK were 
very quickly engaged in everything from collecting clothes 
and shoes to cooking meals and opening their doors to people 
needing shelter.
Impressive as these initiatives were, volunteers quickly began 
to feel overwhelmed. Very few had experience of, or formal 
training in, humanitarian work. For a range of reasons, these 
volunteers were operating outside the existing humanitarian 
system. While the desire to remain independent was key to 
their approach, it also meant they were unable to benefit from 
the experience or support of existing structures. Moreover, 
many were unaware of the vast array of resources available to 
humanitarian workers, often open source and free of charge: 
tools like the Sphere standards, HPN materials and guidance 
produced by ALNAP. They were working passionately, and in 
many cases effectively – but were in obvious need of support.
The need for a RedR response was clearly felt amongst the 
organisation’s staff. Through contact and communication 
with volunteers, mainly via existing professional and personal 
networks, we were gaining an increasing understanding of how 
volunteer groups were operating and, crucially, an awareness 
of the ‘mistakes’ these groups were making, and how these 
mirrored lessons the humanitarian sector has learnt in the 
Adapting approaches: training volunteers responding to the refugee 
crisis 
Rachel Erskine and Katie Robertson
1 See http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php. 
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past. Chief among these were the importance of coordination, 
and how wrong things can go in its absence – a realisation 
which underpins the UN Cluster system, for example – and the 
need for generally accepted standards. There were reports of 
newly created organisations struggling to process the volume 
of donations they were receiving, distributions igniting 
tensions and volunteers experiencing burnout. 
What we did
Unable to secure funding through standard channels, RedR 
raised over £3,000 from staff fundraising activities including cake, 
craft and book sales, a pub quiz and donations collected through 
the BT MyDonate platform. Using these funds and time donated 
by RedR staff and trainers, we developed a one-day training 
course to address the challenges identified by the volunteers. 
The course was designed to help participants view the response 
at a range of levels, from big picture to individual, as well as from 
the perspective of the people affected. Following an overview 
of the situation, sessions covered specific issues, such as needs 
assessment, coordination, distributions and security. Sphere 
standards, accountability, protection and vulnerability were 
introduced, with a focus on ‘do no harm’, before a final session 
encouraged participants to maintain and promote their own 
well-being. The course was delivered three times in September 
and October 2015, twice in London and once in Cardiff, reaching 
64 volunteers. With wide-ranging backgrounds, most had 
experience of volunteering in Calais while others had concrete 
plans to go there. None was a humanitarian professional. All 
wanted to use their existing skills to improve the situation, but 
required guidance as to how to apply these skills. The feedback 
was overwhelmingly positive, with all the participants rating the 
course as good or excellent. ‘I think it’s fantastic that you stepped 
in to build the capacity of communities like mine, and to share 
learning’ said Joy Cherkaoui, a volunteer with the Dumfries and 
Galloway Refugee Action group.
Enabling factors 
The willingness of our staff to go over and above their existing 
work commitments enabled us to design, develop and deliver 
an appropriate training course quickly, and in line with the 
needs identified. We were able to draw on material from 
existing RedR courses, specifically those aimed at new and 
aspiring aid workers. Time donated by our freelance trainers 
to design and deliver the course pro bono meant the training 
could be offered cost-free to participants. Existing partners 
also helped: the Sphere Project donated copies of the Sphere 
handbook and InterHealth delivered the session on well-being 
without charge.
RedR’s unusual position in the humanitarian sector also 
proved to be an enabling factor. As a second-tier organisation 
– one that supports and facilitates the frontline provision 
of aid, rather than delivering it directly – RedR is slightly 
removed from the system. Similarly, our low public profile, 
while challenging at times, proved to be an advantage in this 
case. RedR was not among the ‘household name’ agencies 
perceived to be failing to respond effectively: we were free 
to connect with the community and gather information from 
those on the ground, through social media and one-to-one 
contact. As a result, we were able to go some way to bridging 
the gap between the ‘official’ humanitarian system and the 
grassroots response.
We also drew on the expertise of those operating in Calais, 
including established INGOs and new organisations. Solidarités 
International and Médecins du Monde (MDM) shared their 
on-the-ground experiences in northern France, and CalAid 
provided vital insight into the grassroots response. This ensured 
that the training facilitated learning, and was not just a direct 
transfer from trainer to participant.
Adapting our model
A defining feature of RedR’s work is that we engage with 
humanitarian responders at all levels. Throughout its history, 
RedR has worked to build the humanitarian knowledge and 
skills of non-humanitarians. This includes work with the 
private sector, with first responders including teachers and 
local government, and the training of National Health Service 
(NHS) and Foreign Medical Team healthcare workers during 
the Ebola response. In each case, we have had to adapt our 
operational model to best meet the needs of the audience.
This can also have implications for the way we communicate 
with the target group in question. This was a case in point: 
the grassroots movement was not an audience that could be 
reached through our typical channels of communication. With 
this in mind, we turned to social media, where volunteers were 
mobilising and organising. On the night of 15 September we 
advertised our first training session on the Facebook group 
Volunteers attending a training session run by RedR UK
©Amy Murrell for RedR UK
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‘Calais – People to People Solidarity – Action from UK’.2 The 
reaction was unprecedented. By the next morning, RedR 
staff had been contacted by dozens of volunteers interested 
in attending the training: we received 54 email requests 
overnight, and almost as many Facebook enquiries. There 
were calls for additional dates and training events in other 
parts of the country. Our concerns that suggesting training was 
necessary would be seen as a criticism of the work volunteers 
were doing appeared to be unfounded. ‘Thanks RedR UK 
for offering this invaluable training’ said one member of the 
Facebook group. ‘Many volunteers are eager, willing and ready 
to learn.’ We also tweeted prolifically, posting targeted tweets 
and asking followers to retweet us. One follower commented: 
‘Great to see pros donating tech expertise … It’s a smart idea! 
Lateral thinking, and support to a great civil society movement 
that could use technical skills’.
More recent social media posts have been similarly well received. 
At this stage, it is hard to know whether the warm response 
to this very specific and time-sensitive initiative will result in 
greater awareness of RedR’s wider work. But this new, less rigid 
approach to communications certainly helped us to connect 
with a new community, respond to a clear and pressing need and 
transform a groundswell of good feeling into practical action. 
Our connection with the community also enabled us to develop 
training content based very closely on the needs identified 
by the volunteers. The speed and breadth of communication 
through social media meant that, in the space of a few days, 
volunteers communicated the challenges they were facing, and 
RedR designed and delivered training to address them.
The three one-day training sessions in autumn 2015 were 
delivered free of charge. Globally, RedR’s open training 
programmes usually operate on a cost-recovery basis – 
participant fees are calculated to cover the costs incurred 
by running the training event. Over the last 35 years, we 
have learned that it is important that participants make an 
investment in training – be this a financial investment, a 
time investment in pre-course learning, or both. This helps 
to ensure the right participants attend the course, and that 
they are fully engaged. In the case of the staff-funded refugee 
response training, it was felt that the target audience were 
already investing so many of their own resources in their 
response activities that it would not be appropriate to use the 
usual cost-recovery model. 
In practice, drop-out rates were unusually high. While it has 
been difficult to fully understand the reasons for this, given the 
difficulties in gaining feedback from those who did not attend, 
anecdotal evidence suggests a leading cause was volunteers’ 
belief that they could not afford to take time out from their 
response activities to attend the training. In response to 
ongoing demand for training, a paid-for course was scheduled 
in late November 2015, after the staff-raised funds had been 
exhausted. The course had to be cancelled due to a lack of 
sign-ups, suggesting that indeed the volunteer audience could 
not pay for training. Subsequently, a nominal registration fee 
has been used for future iterations of the course in 2016. Drop-
out rates amongst those who have paid this fee remain low, 
indicating that course fees should reflect overall investment in 
the training by participants. 
Ongoing response
The success of the initial RedR response attracted the attention 
of other organisations. In January 2016 we received support 
from the Humanitarian Leadership Academy (HLA) to expand 
the course into a two-day training session run in London, 
Calais, Belgrade and Lesvos. Between April and June 2016 a 
further eight courses were run in partnership with HLA, drawing 
on the expertise of pro bono trainers from other INGOs now 
involved in the response, and reaching additional locations in 
Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) 
and Slovenia. In addition, RedR was supported by the Stanley 
Thomas Johnson Foundation to deliver ten training courses 
in key locations across Europe before coordinating a lessons-
learnt workshop in London in September 2016.
RedR’s response recognises that volunteers are filling a gap 
in the humanitarian response to the refugee crisis. Aware 
that these highly motivated individuals were committed to 
continuing their activities, we set out to help them do so in 
a more effective and safer way. Feedback from participants 
suggests that this objective has been achieved. 
‘One of the key things I took away from the training is about 
accountability’, says Dan Teuma, who was trained by RedR in 
September 2015 while working for CalAid. He has since gone 
on to establish The Worldwide Tribe, working in Greece and 
Turkey. ‘I am now far more conscious about the impact of my 
and others’ actions with regards to delivering support and aid: 
making sure that I also look at the bigger picture and not just 
the immediate impact of our actions.’
The evolving situation on the ground has required RedR to 
keep adapting and updating our response. In recent months, 
we have expanded the range of options we are offering, 
including tailored consultancy support, free online resources 
on well-being and self-care and mentoring. Perhaps the 
biggest lesson we have learned, as an organisation, is the need 
for flexibility. We have had to adapt our operational model – 
and keep adapting it as the crisis evolves: from the initial staff-
led funding drive to a different way of communicating with 
our audience, a more rapid and frequent process of course 
design and review and an alternative approach to investment 
in learning through free or highly subsidised training. In 
many ways, RedR’s response mirrors that of the volunteers – 
people passionate about the cause, donating their time and 
employing their existing skills to contribute to improving the 
situation of refugees across Europe.
Katie Robertson is a Programme Manager in RedR UK’s 
Europe and Global Initiatives department. Rachel Erskine is 
RedR UK’s Communications Coordinator. 
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Responding to the needs of refugees and vulnerable migrants  
in Europe
Elodie Francart with John Borton
In September 2015 several thousand refugees and vulnerable 
migrants arrived in Belgium. The Belgian government imposed 
limits on the daily number of asylum request registrations, 
leaving asylum-seekers sleeping outside without any support 
and in legal limbo. This ‘pre-registration period’ between 
the arrival of the asylum-seekers and their submission of an 
asylum request generally lasted for between two and ten 
days. A camp rapidly developed in Maximillian Park in central 
Brussels, growing quickly to around 1,200 people; meanwhile, 
a citizen platform was formed calling on the Belgian population 
to support asylum-seekers forced to live on the street, and to 
put pressure on the government to relax its stance.
The response was remarkable. The Citizen Platform to Support 
Refugees Facebook page attracted 30,000 followers in its first 
month, and hundreds of volunteers came forward to provide 
support to residents of the Maximillian Park camp. On average 
300 volunteers were present in the camp on weekdays and 
500 over the weekends. Several humanitarian NGOs were also 
present: Médecins du Monde (MDM) supported volunteers in 
the provision of medical assistance, Oxfam provided advice 
on sorting and organising the distribution of donated clothes 
and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) (Belgium) focused on 
providing logistical support for shelter, water and sanitation.
Coordination with these NGO actors was a key concern within the 
Citizen Platform. In many cases a designated NGO would carry 
out a short assessment and follow-up decisions would be taken 
by the Citizen Platform. In terms of organisation, the Citizen 
Platform comprised a General Assembly bringing together 
working groups on topics such as finance, communications 
and advocacy. Representatives of each working group met 
once a week with a central coordination group, and volunteers 
responsible for the day-to-day running of the camp held daily 
coordination meetings. The camp in Maximillian Park operated 
for a month until the Belgian government gave in to pressure 
and opened a new accommodation centre in Brussels, at which 
point the camp was closed.
The Civil Society Networking Project
The Brussels experience demonstrated that a collaborative 
approach between citizens’ groups and NGOs is possible and 
could provide an effective response for people in need. Each 
considered the other as a valid actor, which had not always 
been the case in the past. In addition, the Citizen Platform 
showed that it could mobilise public opinion and bring 
pressure to bear on the government to change its policy. For 
its part, MSF viewed such civil society initiatives as a way of 
developing new forms of operational response and creating 
new alliances with citizens (potentially across Europe) to 
oppose restrictive state policies. 
To understand where and how these groups of volunteers are 
working, and how MSF could better cooperate with them, MSF 
Belgium launched a ‘Civil Society Networking Project’. The main 
aim was to improve the relationship with civil society and to see 
how a large NGO such as MSF could support these groups with 
logistical and technical help. The first phase of work aimed at 
understanding the different profiles, perspectives, needs and 
relationships among the large number of volunteer groups 
established in Europe. With the support of MSF Belgium, four 
activists from the Citizen Platform travelled around Europe for 
four and a half months, engaging with a wide range of citizen 
initiatives. Two main types of civil society initiatives were 
identified: operational initiatives working directly with refugees, 
and information-sharing initiatives between volunteers, and 
between refugees and the host population.
We found that, whilst the principal strength of many civil society 
initiatives is their flexibility, informality, commitment and self-
organisation, fragility and instability are an inherent part of their 
make-up – in effect two sides of the same coin. This instability 
derives from fluid and unpredictable staffing, in terms of the 
numbers of volunteers present on any given day and their lack 
of specific training; unpredictable and often precarious funding; 
and the reality of volunteering and its impact on volunteers’ 
physical and psychological health. Yet despite this, volunteer 
groups remain vital actors in the humanitarian response. Even 
now, a year after many of them were established – itself an 
indicator of their stability as a community, if not necessarily 
as individual entities – volunteer groups continue to play 
key frontline roles across Europe, from Greece to France and 
from Italy to Sweden. Irrespective of the advantages and 
disadvantages that come with their citizen and voluntary nature, 
helping refugees and vulnerable migrants and responding to 
their needs defines their outlook and actions, and is an objective 
they are not ready to give up on despite all the obstacles they 
face. Civil society initiatives have their own identity and their 
own particular forms of ‘stability’ and continuity, and have to 
be taken as such, without trying to mould them into the more 
conventional forms of organisation that NGOs are used to 
working with. The conclusion of the first phase of the project 
was that the unpredictability present in many volunteer groups 
should not be a reason for NGOs not to engage and collaborate 
with them, because it is an inherent part of their make-up and 
something which, for the most part, they are able to manage. 
The second aspect of the Civil Society Project has involved 
operational support. Usually, links between NGOs and volunteer 
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groups on the ground are absent: volunteers don’t know who 
to talk to within NGOs, what they can ask for or which kinds of 
support they can expect. To help with this, in March 2016 MSF 
created a Focal Point for Volunteers in Idomeni in Greece. At the 
time, Idomeni was the largest refugee camp in Europe; many 
international and Greek volunteers were involved in providing 
assistance, and as such it was an obvious place to strengthen 
cooperation. Efforts focused on supporting the volunteers 
logistically, and helping them share information and develop 
a common strategy. Although the impact of the role has not 
been formally evaluated, many of the NGOs and volunteer 
groups involved felt that it had helped improve the quality of 
the relationships and level of trust between the two groups of 
actors, and thereby contributed to improved coordination. 
Since the closure of the Idomeni camp in May 2016, the Civil 
Society Project has continued to support efforts to improve 
communication and trust between volunteer groups and NGOs 
in Greece and other countries, and to broaden the project to 
include volunteer groups working in destination and reception 
countries, including Norway and the UK. 
Networkin’ Europe
During the period of the refugee camp in Maximillian Park and 
prior to the start of the Civil Society Project, some of those 
involved in the Citizen Platform organised a meeting to which 
representatives of volunteer groups in other European countries 
were invited. The objective was to establish links between the 
volunteer groups forming across Europe. A second, larger, two-
day meeting was held in Berlin in February 2016 with support 
from the Civil Society Project. A third meeting was held in 
Brussels at the end of May 2016. The meeting room and facilities 
were provided by MSF and the schedule included an evening 
meeting hosted by the European United Left/Nordic Green 
Left (EUL/NGL) group within the European Parliament. From 
these three meetings a group has been formed comprising 
45 volunteers from 18 European countries. Currently the 
group operates under the name Networkin’ Europe, though 
this is likely to change as it finalises its communication and 
networking strategies. Communication within the group is 
principally through a closed Facebook Group, but a website is 
planned in the near future. The group is largely self-funded, with 
occasional support from MSF (Belgium).
Reflections
NGOs are grappling with how best to engage and collaborate 
with the many volunteer and civil society groups that sprang 
up across Europe in 2015 and early 2016. MSF’s experience 
with its Civil Society Project has been positive, demonstrating 
the benefits of a conscious effort to engage with and support 
volunteer groups.
As the situation has evolved from supporting refugees and 
migrants in transit to one of closed borders and ‘stranded’ 
populations, so too have the opportunities for collaboration. 
A refugee camp beside the Paris metro, France.
©Mary Finn
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Political statements and advocacy by humanitarian NGOs 
are not having much impact on European policies towards 
refugees and vulnerable migrants, and NGOs are facing 
challenges to their principles, for instance by requests from 
governments to work inside state-run camps and asylum 
processing facilities. In this evolving context volunteer groups 
offer NGOs the ability to engage with and support citizen 
groups grounded in their local societies. Collaborating with 
citizen groups enables NGOs to reach a wider public and 
demonstrate that not everybody is against refugees and 
vulnerable migrants coming to Europe.
Despite their fragility and inherent instability, volunteer groups 
frequently work with a longer-term perspective than is usual 
among humanitarian NGOs. Besides meeting basic needs, civil 
society groups are helping refugees to better understand and 
integrate into the societies they find themselves in, including 
through the provision of language classes and multicultural 
events. Volunteer groups also offer NGOs a means of aligning 
more closely with civil society in a context where state policies 
towards refugees and vulnerable migrants have, in many 
countries, become decidedly callous and inhumane. For their 
part, volunteer groups have much to learn from NGOs and the 
best practices that they have developed over decades. 
There are of course challenges and limitations in this collabo-
ration as each actor needs to be able to keep their identity and 
independence. Questions that need to be considered include 
how NGOs can retain their neutrality when collaborating with 
groups with strong political opinions; how to cope with admin-
istrative demands whilst not undermining the spontaneity 
of volunteer groups; how to avoid being held responsible for 
mistakes made by partners; and how to sustain a critical voice 
regarding their governments’ policies. Many of these questions 
are not new, either to NGOs or volunteer groups, and sharing 
each other’s perspectives and experience might offer a way of 
resolving them to the benefit of both. 
Elodie Francart worked as a volunteer in the Citizens Platform. 
Since October 2015 she has been a member of the Civil Society 
Project Team and served as the Focal Point for Volunteers in 
Idomeni.  
Temporary palliatives to an ongoing humanitarian need: MSF’s 
intervention in Dunkirk
Angélique Muller and Michaël Neuman
Many towns and villages in northern France, including Calais 
and more recently Grande-Synthe, have provided shelter since 
the mid-1990s to migrants on their way to the UK. With the 
arrival of migrants transiting from North Africa and Turkey, 
their numbers rose sharply during 2015 – from several hundred 
in Calais in March 2015 to over 6,000 by the end of the year, 
and from a few dozen to more than 2,000 in Basroch camp in 
Grande-Synthe. This increase should have come as a surprise 
to no one, particularly anyone following developments in the 
Syrian conflict or studying migration flows, but the French 
government’s state of denial led to yet more hardship for 
people reduced to living in deplorable conditions.
From quagmire to ‘humanitarian camp’
Grande-Synthe in France’s Nord Department has a population 
of 22,000. Like many others in the region, this former 
industrial town is undergoing a painful process of economic 
regeneration. Nevertheless, the local council was determined 
to provide decent living conditions and assistance to migrants 
(whose numbers fluctuated between 50 and 80 prior to June 
2015) in the Grande-Synthe area. Damien Carême, who was a 
member of the Socialist Party before joining the Green Party, 
became the town’s mayor in 2001. Among his achievements 
has been his contribution to establishing a ‘Réseau des Elus 
Hospitaliers’ (Network of Hospitable Mayors) to facilitate the 
hosting of migrants in the Nord Pas-de-Calais region. 
While migrants had been seeking shelter in the Basroch woods 
since the 2000s, summer 2015 saw a considerable increase in 
new arrivals, culminating in a surge by the end of the year. At the 
end of 2015, over 2,500 people were living in Basroch, mostly 
Iraqi Kurds, but also Syrians, Afghans, Iranians, Vietnamese and 
members of Kuwait’s Bedoon community.1 In October 2015, 
alerted by reports of increasing numbers of migrants and 
the poor health and sanitation situation, associations and 
volun-teers from the UK (Aid Box Convoy, Humming Birds 
and Refugee Community Kitchen), Belgium (Solidarity for 
All), Switzerland and the Netherlands (Rastplatz) joined local 
organisations working in the area, including Médecins du 
Monde (MDM), Carrefour Solidarités, Emmanüs, AMIS, Salam 
and Terre d’Errance. 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) deployed in Grande-Synthe in 
September, but we knew little about the actors involved, how 
they interacted with each other or what had been done in the 
past. MSF also found it no easy task negotiating its way among 
the numerous stakeholders on the ground, and navigating 
the intricacies of the French administration was unchartered 
territory. Relations with the volunteers, some of whom were 
unwilling to accept the vertical organisation favoured by MSF, 
1 Quite literally stateless, this community of several hundred thousand people 
did not acquire Kuwaiti citizenship after the country became independent in 
1961. They have no political rights whatsoever.
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were at times tense. Alternating with MDM, MSF delivered 
primary health care three days a week, provided logistical 
support to voluntary associations and endeavoured to improve 
the camp’s atrocious and steadily deteriorating sanitation. 
People smugglers commandeered and imposed a charge for 
showers installed by the town council, and, until January 2016, 
there was just one standpipe. The weather worsened rapidly, 
foretelling a sodden and muddy winter. The migrants put up 
small camping tents to provide some shelter.  
The mayor of Grande-Synthe, Carême, received no response 
from the government to his increasingly frequent appeals 
for help with rehousing the migrants. Prime Minister Manuel 
Valls did not deem it necessary to answer or indeed even 
acknowledge receipt of letters from the town council appealing 
for assistance. This lack of response typified the government’s 
lack of concern for these ‘undesirables’, and its refusal to either 
acknowledge the problems the town hall was experiencing 
trying to cope with the influx or attempt to find a solution to 
the migrants’ predicament. In November, in view of the lack of 
government action, the mayor asked MSF for help with building 
a new camp on a nearby site. Carême and MSF also scheduled 
a press conference to announce their plans for the new camp, 
but the day before it was due to be held the mayor received and 
accepted an invitation to discuss the situation with the Minister 
of the Interior. This was considered a major breakthrough, as 
the government had consistently refused to contemplate long-
term accommodation for the refugees.
By now it was the beginning of January. Many viewed Basroch 
as the ‘Calais Jungle, but worse’. Their tents flooded, people 
slept in a muddy quagmire in a camp that had by now come 
to resemble a gigantic rubbish dump. Illnesses caused by the 
cold (respiratory infections) and lack of hygiene (scabies and 
skin infections) were difficult to treat. People were living in 
inhuman conditions, driven by their only ray of hope – getting 
across the Channel. Far more migrants arrived than departed, 
with a few succeeding in getting to the UK and others relocating 
to temporary reception centres set up across France.
Thanks to the groundswell of solidarity from many associations 
and volunteers from all kinds of backgrounds, no lives were 
lost. There were over 40 mostly voluntary associations working 
in Basroch camp. Coordination was practically non-existent, 
with the exception of medical services organised by the 
Ministry of Health. For the most part, basic items and services, 
such as food, blankets, tents, heaters, fuelwood and schooling, 
were largely managed by volunteers. The lack of organisation, 
unplanned donations and control exerted by people smugglers 
led to real difficulties. At weekends, hundreds of people would 
arrive at the camp and distribute items as they saw fit, leaving 
others – including MSF, who would spend hours collecting 
rubbish on Mondays – to clean up the mess. To many at MSF, 
the waste was all the more unacceptable as the camp was less 
than 30 metres from a modest but well-maintained housing 
estate, a third of Grande-Synthe’s population lived below the 
poverty line and unemployment was almost 30%. 
A woman and child at the old Grande-Synthe camp site near Dunkirk, France.
©MSF
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While MSF staff and others took care of day-to-day tasks in 
Basroch camp, construction began on a new camp several 
kilometres away, on a site known as La Linière. Soon an entire 
village designed to accommodate 2,500 people began to take 
shape. Long and narrow, and sandwiched between a railway 
line and a motorway, the site was far from ideal. Furthermore, 
MSF had no particular experience of setting up refugee camps, 
let alone in France. Tents or wood cabins? Should heaters be 
installed? How much space should be given over to communal 
areas? Should the camp be viewed as the foundation of a future 
village? How could ties be established with Grande-Synthe? How 
could architectural aspects be taken into account when speed 
was of the essence? The hesitations were as many as the U-turns. 
Once construction began, the priority was to inform the 
migrants about their upcoming relocation. Meanwhile, 
Carême, the mayor of Grande-Synthe, insisted that the old site 
be razed to the ground. Despite its unease, MSF never spoke 
out clearly about this, saying instead that people could only be 
moved on a voluntary basis. Meanwhile, the government set 
up a Temporary Reception Centre (Centre d’Accueil Provisoire, 
or CAP) just outside the camp in Calais to accommodate some 
of its inhabitants. The centre’s use of palm print recognition 
technology and other harsh constraints highlighted the 
contrast with what was being accomplished in Grande-Synthe. 
After seven weeks of construction and meetings, the camp at 
La Linière was ready to receive people from Basroch. The move 
itself began on 7 March and lasted three days. It was supervised 
by around 100 volunteers from various associations and 25 MSF 
staff. Using buses hired by the town hall, around 900 people 
were relocated on the first day, and by the fourth Basroch was 
empty. No police intervention was necessary. Over 1,300 people 
(numbers had decreased as some had gone to emergency 
accommodation and others to CAOs or to the UK) were now 
installed in the new camp in wood cabins with access to basic 
services such as toilets, showers and meals. Carême appointed 
volunteer service provider Utopia 56 to manage the site. Irony of 
ironies, a few days after the move Carême received an injunction 
requiring him to bring La Linière camp ‘up to standard’, as the 
government considered that the safety of its residents was at 
risk. In the meantime, the authorities had begun razing the 
southern – and busiest – part of the Calais ‘Jungle’, leaving its 
inhabitants either to go to the CAP or to the northern part of the 
camp, or leave Calais altogether.
Conclusion
The successful logistical operation to relocate the residents 
of Basroch to La Linière camp enabled – and was only 
possible because of – an improbable coalition of elected 
representatives, municipal officials, political activists and 
humanitarian workers. The episode demonstrates that the 
construction of a dignified space that includes congenial 
communal areas to accommodate and address the basic 
needs of refugees is achievable at reasonable cost. And who 
knows, it could even be an indication of the shape of future 
collaborative initiatives to foster the local integration of 
migrants in other French and European towns. 
The neighbouring town of Téteghem, which for many years has 
also had to cope with migrants in transit, is a good example 
of how very hard it is for elected representatives to resist 
pressure from the national authorities and the public to 
remove migrant camps. In November 2015, at the behest of 
the town’s mayor and after a court ruling, the camp in the 
town, which was supported by volunteers and associations 
and accommodated 200 to 250 migrants, was flattened 
because of tensions and suspicions of trafficking related 
to clandestine immigration. However, shortly after the 
successful setting up of the La Linière camp, the mayor, an 
elected member of the Les Républicains party, expressed his 
regret at having razed the camp and praised his neighbour’s 
courage and perseverance.
The La Linière camp is a barometer of the power of public 
discourse and the ability to overcome fears regarding public 
opinion. Although it is difficult to gauge the views of Basroch’s 
inhabitants on the continuing presence of migrants in transit 
in their town – even more so as their numbers grew – we can 
attest to the incomprehension and resentment felt by some 
local people. That said, little or no violence against migrants 
has been reported, nor have militias been formed as they have 
in Calais. We believe that this is in part due to the efforts of 
the mayor to communicate both his determination to tackle 
people-smuggling and his compassion for the refugees, an 
appropriate police presence and the relationship established 
between the authorities and the migrants.
La Linière has resolved little, apart from enabling 1,000 
people to escape the cold and mud. Thanks to the impetus 
and actions of numerous partner associations, a degree of 
social and collective life has begun to emerge. Nevertheless, 
residents’ sights remain resolutely set on the UK and 
there is still a great deal of tension – among the migrants 
themselves, between people smugglers and migrants, and 
at times between migrants and aid organisations. As for the 
migrants’ prospects, their options are more than limited. In a 
context where the countries of Europe continue to ignore the 
consequences of their actions, and their migrant policies are 
confined to erecting fences, the Grande-Synthe camp can only 
be a solution that is as much makeshift as it is inadequate. 
Angélique Muller was MSF project coordinator at Grande-
Synthe between January and April 2016. Michaël Neuman is 
director of studies, MSF – CRASH. 
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Neither safe nor sound: unaccompanied children on the coastline of 
the English Channel and the North Sea
Alexandre Le Clève, Evangeline Masson-Diez and Olivier Peyroux
Since January 2015, some 1.2 million people have made the 
perilous journey across the Mediterranean in an attempt to 
reach Europe. One striking feature of this mass movement 
of people has been the growing number of children among 
those reaching Europe’s shores. In June 2015, one in ten of the 
refugees and migrants was a child. By the end of December 
it was one in three. Today, children make up 40% of the 
refugees and migrants stranded in Greece. The majority come 
from countries in war and conflict: Afghanistan, Sudan, Iraq 
and Syria. Others travel from zones of economic and social 
breakdown. Throughout their journeys, refugee and migrant 
children suffer terribly – stranded at borders, forced to sleep in 
the open, exposed to rain and heat, left without access to basic 
services and easy prey for smugglers and traffickers. 
Unaccompanied and separated children are at particular 
risk. Once they reach France they have limited access to 
hygiene facilities and food and no access to education. 
Threats to their safety are incessant: they don’t benefit from 
protection mechanisms, and the current procedures of family 
reunification are far from effective. The situation in other 
European countries is similar. In an effort to understand the 
situation of unaccompanied refugee and migrant children in 
Northern France, Unicef France commissioned the organisation 
TRAJECTOIRES to undertake a study to bring out the human 
stories of some of these children. The study was carried out 
between January and April 2016 across seven sites along the 
French coast (Calais, Grande-Synthe, Angres, Norrent Fontes, 
Steenvoorde, Tatinghem and Cherbourg). Through these 
children’s testimonies, we learned about their journeys. 
A children’s crisis in Europe
Data on the number of unaccompanied children in the region 
are unreliable, but based on attempted censuses by various 
organisations we estimate that around 2,000 have passed 
through the seven sites in our study since June 2015. Based on 
our sample, the average duration of their stay in the ‘jungle’ was 
five months; some had been on the coast for nine months and 
one had been there for over a year. On most of the sites included 
in the study, an ‘entry fee’ is levied by the traffickers before the 
children are allowed to stay there. Unaccompanied children 
who are unable to pay find themselves forced to perform 
laborious tasks for the adults: searching for water, queuing for 
Child refugees in the Grande-Synthe camp.
©UNHCR/Federico Scoppa
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the showers on behalf of adults, doing the cleaning around 
shelters and reselling food collected during distributions at the 
informal night-time market in the Calais ‘jungle’.  
All the children we interviewed complained of cold and fatigue. 
The most vulnerable were living in shelters exposed to the 
elements and had difficulty in accessing meals and showers. 
None has access to regular schooling, despite the fact that this 
is mandatory. Many told us that they cannot stand the ongoing 
inactivity that they must endure whilst waiting to attempt to 
cross into the UK each night, which can lead to nervousness 
and symptoms of depression. Some unaccompanied children 
spoke of mental breakdown and aggressive and violent 
episodes (directed towards themselves or other young 
people). Fights between migrants are becoming more and 
more commonplace, particularly in Calais, and especially 
since the southern part of the ‘jungle’ was evacuated. Children 
are among those at greatest risk from these types of violence. 
The main fears expressed were violence by the police, civilian 
militias and traffickers. Sexual assault against both girls and 
boys is a constant threat. Young people exchange sexual 
services for the promise of passage to the UK or to pay for their 
journey. Rape and sexual violence is a significant concern: 
our study found children being regularly sexually abused, 
often by traffickers and their friends under the influence of 
alcohol. Several cases of Vietnamese children being exploited 
on cannabis farms in the UK, in Strasbourg and in the greater 
Paris area have also been recorded. 
Risks along the journey
Most of the children interviewed used traffickers.1 In order to 
reach France they are charged anything between €2,700 and 
€10,000. The routes taken differ according to the person’s 
financial means. For the more affluent unaccompanied 
children, the journey is organised and paid for before they leave 
their country of origin. A guide paid by the traffickers (referred 
to as ‘uncle’) takes over in each new country they cross and 
escorts the children to the border. Unaccompanied children 
from poorer families must get by using their own means and 
negotiate with local traffickers in each country. This difference 
between ‘guaranteed’ passage and what is achieved on a 
country-by-country basis explains the widely varying durations 
of children’s journeys, from 15 days to seven months. 
Regardless of the chosen method, the route remains highly 
dangerous. Several children told us that they had been held by 
a number of different criminal groups and a ransom demand 
had been sent to their family. Some had to work under near 
slave-like conditions for months to pay for their journey. 
Others were detained by the local authorities. Relations with 
the ‘uncles’ were rarely benevolent. We heard accounts of 
children who walked too slowly being abandoned. In many 
cases, the sea crossing between Turkey and Greece or Libya/
Egypt and Italy has been traumatising. Sexual abuse also 
appears to be commonplace during the journey. 
As different points of passage (such as parking areas for lorries 
or trains) have been secured by the authorities, it has become 
practically impossible to cross over to the UK without help 
from traffickers. The cost of crossing the English Channel has 
never been higher: between €5,000 and €7,000 per person. 
This forces unaccompanied children to take significant risks in 
order to pass through without paying (by hiding themselves in 
refrigerated lorries or inside containers, for example). 
The protection system
The protection of unaccompanied children is a state obli-
gation, as laid out in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
In France, departmental councils are the leading agency with 
respect to child protection. Each department creates its own 
intervention plan, but this approach is too fragmented to 
benefit young people from a wide range of backgrounds, who 
are vulnerable and mobile and who move from one depart-
ment to another or stay regularly in Paris. The Pas-de-Calais 
Departmental Council has implemented a system, managed by 
the organisation France Terre d’Asile (FTDA), which attempts 
to deal with the issue of unaccompanied children to some 
extent. Over 80% of the unaccompanied children integrated 
into this system have been contacted by the organisation. 
FTDA teams visit the Calais ‘jungle’ almost every day, as 
well as occasionally visiting the sites at Norrent Fontes and 
Tatinghem. Charitable organisations are also active, and have 
regular contact with unaccompanied children. There is no 
specific system in place in the Manche and Nord departments 
and no form of intervention on the sites there has been 
implemented. Across all the sites in our study, getting young 
people to speak on a confidential basis is extremely difficult; 
the constant presence of adults from their community and the 
lack of privacy in the camps make it almost impossible to form 
a bond with the children, hampering efforts to help them.
Alternative accommodation and reception systems, such as 
those at the Jules Ferry Centre and the temporary reception 
centre managed by La Vie Active, do not have the required 
authorisation or possess the necessary framework to receive 
and house unaccompanied children. Those dedicated state-
run sites that do exist are full, and there is a desperate lack of 
accommodation. To be awarded a place in an accommodation 
centre, unaccompanied children are forced to declare 
themselves adults or must come forward accompanied by 
an older ‘cousin’ or ‘uncle’, which puts them at greater risk of 
being manipulated by malicious adults. 
Unaccompanied children living in the ‘jungles’ of Calais, 
Grande-Synthe and the other sites are often viewed as young 
people in transit, with an ‘unwavering determination to cross 
1 Children spoken to during the course of the study did not always 
differentiate between a smuggler (where the purpose of moving or harbouring 
a child is solely monetary) and a trafficker (where the purpose is exploitation); 
as such the term ‘passeur’ was used in the French version, which has 
subsequently been translated to ‘trafficker’ in English given the nature of the 
testimonies provided by children.
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1 G. Jones et al., ‘Child Survival: How Many Child Deaths Can We Prevent This 
Year’, The Lancet, 362, 2003; N. C. Rollins et al., ‘Why Invest, and What Will It 
Take To Improve Breastfeeding Practices?, The Lancet, 387, 2016.
the English Channel’, making it impossible to propose a project 
that will offer them protection in France. Only the family 
reunification process, as described by the EU Regulation 
of 26 June 2013 known as ‘Dublin III’, which establishes the 
deciding criteria and mechanisms by which the responsible 
member state is to assess an application for international 
protection, can be suggested to them. This process, which 
provides a restrictive interpretation of the term ‘family’, is 
lengthy, complex and poorly controlled, and has been rarely 
used. Between the beginning of 2016 April, 52 referrals were 
submitted, 24 decisions were made (22 approvals, 20 of which 
related to children) and 20 transfers were carried out.
Although some unaccompanied children are under the influ- 
ence of exploitation networks, all find themselves in a danger-
ous situation due to their isolation and living conditions. 
Changes to the child protection system are urgently needed 
to enable unaccompanied children to access effective means 
of protection which respect the rights of the child, no matter 
what their migration plans may be. Faced with greater and 
greater risks of violence and exploitation on account of their 
longer stays and more difficult journeys, it is essential that 
new solutions are found. A secure and sustainable framework 
must be in place for the children who will arrive over the 
coming months so that they are able to avoid situations which 
increase their vulnerability.
Neither Safe Nor Sound: Unaccompanied Children on the 
Coastline of the English Channel and the North Sea was 
published in June 2016. It is a joint publication: of Unicef France 
and Unicef UK, and is available at http://www.unicef.org.uk/
Latest/Publications/Neither-Safe-Nor-Sound. The study was 
written by Alexandre Le Clève, Evangeline Masson-Diez and 
Olivier Peyroux of TRAJECTOIRES.
Infant and young child feeding in Greece: Save the Children’s 
experience
Minh Tram Le, Claudine Prudhon, Anne-Marie Mayer and Megan Gayford 
The youngest children are the most vulnerable during emerg- 
encies. Risks associated with malnutrition and disease 
increase and child mortality can soar up to 70 times higher 
than average. Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF) is 
key to reducing the morbidity and mortality of children. 
Breastfeeding is the single most effective intervention to save 
children’s lives and could prevent 13% of all deaths among 
children under five years, while appropriate complementary 
feeding could prevent another 6% of deaths.1 This paper 
discusses Save the Children (SC)’s Infant and Young Child 
Feeding in Emergency (IYCF-E) response in Greece, through 
the opening of mother and baby areas in Kara Tepe and Moria 
camps on Lesvos and in Idomeni transit camp on the border 
with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).
The IYCF-E intervention
IYCF-E encompasses a range of key actions to support safe and 
appropriate feeding practices for infants from 0 to 11 months 
and young children aged 12 to 24 months:
• Protection, promotion and support of breastfeeding.
• Assessment of feeding practices and needs.
• Support for the non-breastfed infants and 
management of breast milk substitutes (BMS) such as 
infant formula. 
• Support for timely, safe and appropriate complemen-
tary feeding for children from six months old.
• Support for pregnant and breastfeeding women.
SC launched a rapid assessment following the sudden arrival of 
more than 50,000 people on the Greek islands in July 2015. As 
the assessment team did not observe any visible signs of wasting 
or an alarming health or food security situation, and in the main 
countries of origin (Syria and Afghanistan) wasting levels are 
not critical, systematic screening/identification and wasting 
treatment programmes were not warranted. However, there 
was a critical need to protect optimal feeding practices: women 
reported reducing or discontinuing breast-feeding because of 
the lack of privacy and time and the stress they faced during 
their journey, and a misplaced belief that, because they were not 
eating well themselves, they did not have enough milk. Support 
to non-breastfed infants also appeared urgent due to the 
increased risk of diarrhoea related to the use of infant formula 
in camps where hygiene conditions were poor and access to 
drinking water was inconsistent. Facilities and equipment to 
safely prepare infant formula were limited, and some caregivers 
were observed feeding infants with undiluted powder milk 
or cow’s milk, not measuring water to be added to infant 
formula and using dirty bottles. A large number of unsolicited 
distributions of breast milk substitute (BMS) were also reported, 
in violation of the International Code of Marketing of BMS.
The primary goal of the IYCF-E intervention in Greece was to 
support breastfeeding and non-breastfeeding caretakers in 
mother and baby areas (MBAs), where they could rest, feed and 
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play with their children, bath their babies and receive nutrition 
and psychosocial support. The MBAs were established in the 
same compound as the child friendly spaces (CFS) run by SC, 
enabling caretakers and children to safely circulate between 
the sites and to access a comprehensive package of services. 
Orientation on feeding practices was offered by skilled 
counsellors, using communication materials in appropriate 
languages. In-depth counselling was possible depending on 
the presence of interpreters in the camps, though this was 
limited given the challenges facing the women and their urgent 
desire to continue their journey. Infants requiring BMS were 
referred for provision of infant formula and safe preparation 
kits within the programme or through a medical partner.
Two MBAs opened in October 2015 on Lesvos, after an interim 
period where SC provided IYCF-E support through medical 
partners and the CFS, while the site to be allocated to the 
MBA was confirmed by the camp authorities. Another MBA 
was subsequently opened in Idomeni, though this site faced a 
number of challenges, including regular damage, temporary 
and unpredictable closures of the camp by the authorities and 
limited access for NGOs. When a nearby petrol station was 
turned into accommodation for the excessive number of people 
arriving at the border, a mobile unit was set up to cover a larger 
number of children. 
In February 2016 a survey of caretakers of children below 24 
months was conducted on Lesvos to quantify IYCF practices and 
identify priority needs. At this point, in the depths of winter, the 
daily number of arrivals had decreased and the situation was 
calmer. In total, 148 children were included in the assessment. 
The results confirmed the serious situation regarding IYCF 
practices and the general wellbeing of children and caretakers: 
breastfeeding patterns were far from optimal and the majority 
of mothers reported difficulties in breastfeeding. Around 30% 
of the caretakers were feeding their children infant formula 
that they had bought or received from charities. A majority 
of caretakers were using bottles but could not reach cleaning 
facilities. Feeding frequency was insufficient and dietary 
diversity poor due to the lack of fresh food during the journey, 
lack of money and distress of the mother and the child. Before 
the EU–Turkey deal in March 2016, NGOs and volunteers’ 
associations were the only ones providing food assistance, 
distributing more than 10,000 meals per day in some locations.
Since March 2016, the government has opened more than 
50 formal camps, and in July 2016 SC was running eight 
MBAs covering 16 camps in FYROM, Attica, Lesvos and Chios. 
Between October 2015 and June 2016, IYCF activities reached 
approximately 11,000 children and 10,900 caregivers.
Coordinating IYCF activities
While a large number of humanitarian organisations are present 
in Greece, few are supporting nutrition. SC receives financial 
support from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
and, more recently, technical support from Unicef, but remains 
the main nutrition actor in the response. Individuals and 
A mother and child in a Save the Children mother and baby area at a refugee camp in Lesvos, Greece.
©Anna Pantelia/Save the Children
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volunteer organisations were predominant from the outset of 
the emergency, and some volunteers’ associations, such as 
Project Nurture International, have started to focus on IYCF-E, 
improving the coverage of services. 
In Lesvos, a health and nutrition working group led by UNHCR 
began meeting regularly from the end of summer 2015. Many 
humanitarian and non-humanitarian actors were not aware of 
international guidance on IYCF-E, and SC conducted several 
sensitisation sessions to protect breastfeeding practices and 
reduce untargeted distributions of BMS. It has not been possible 
to quantify the impact of the sensitisation sessions on reduced 
untargeted distributions of BMS. At the national level, health 
working group meetings covering nutrition issues started in 
February 2016. At the global level, international NGOs and 
UN agencies conducted bi-weekly calls, co-chaired by SC and 
UNICEF, to share relevant information, materials and resources, 
promote consistency in the application of global guidance and 
identify areas needing additional guidance. The platform was 
also used to highlight IYCF-E needs in the West Balkan countries.
Difficulties in implementation of IYCF-E 
interventions
A number of challenges specific to this crisis arose. First, people 
were moving rapidly, allowing only a limited time (from a few 
minutes to a few hours) for caretaker and child assessment, 
support and referral. The number of refugees arriving in transit 
areas varied greatly day by day, making forecasting and staffing 
of interventions difficult. Moreover, no demographic data for 
children less than two years was available. Second, a wealth 
of nationalities was represented and cultural mediators were 
urgently required. Their limited availability, the lack of people 
trained in IYCF and legal constraints on non-EU passport 
holders working in Greece markedly affected the quality of the 
intervention. Third, the high proportion of infants dependent on 
infant formula before the start of their journey led to frequent 
requests for BMS, while service coverage was too low to ensure 
prior counselling and suitable preparation. Lastly, there was 
insufficient attention to ensuring adequate complementary 
feeding by all responders and volunteers: the food distributed 
was either not suitable for young children (i.e. too hard) or 
consisted of jars of baby food unfamiliar to caretakers, and with 
no information in the appropriate language or confirmation 
that it was a halal product. Despite efforts in coordination and 
capacity-building, untargeted donations and distributions of 
BMS and bottles, by actors unaware of international guidance 
on IYCF-E interventions were regularly reported. 
The response after the EU–Turkey deal
Following the implementation of the EU–Turkey deal in 
March 2016, programmes across Europe have been adjusted. 
Most of the former reception sites on the Greek islands have 
been turned into detention centres, and the government 
now manages more than 50 camps, with the support of UN 
agencies, international and local NGOs and volunteers.
Recent assessments highlight the persistent lack of coverage 
of IYCF services and the need to reinforce some aspects of 
interventions. Collaboration with the various ministries and key 
decision-makers involved is being developed by food security, 
health and nutrition working groups to prioritise IYCF, and 
provide appropriate food assistance for the most vulnerable, 
including the elderly and people with health conditions. In 
terms of IYCF, the main priority actions remain:
• The establishment of safe environments for caretakers 
with young children, along with strengthened outreach 
activities.
• Reinforcement of the screening of caretakers and 
children and support to breastfeeding and non-
breastfeeding caretakers, with counselling adapted to 
a population no longer on the move (e.g. re-lactation 
support and maternal health activities and messages).
• The provision of adequate complementary food for 
children over six months to reduce risks of undernutrition 
and morbidity in a population entirely dependent on 
food assistance.
• The integration of IYCF-E within all services, but 
specifically protection and psychosocial support, to 
help reduce distress among caretakers and children.
Conclusion
The rapidly changing situation, high numbers of refugees and 
migrants and the specific transit context stretched the capacities 
of organisations and volunteers to respond effectively, indicating 
a need for better preparedness and coordination in a European 
context generally unknown to many of those involved. The 
presence of a larger number of organisations with nutrition 
capacities could have increased the coverage and effectiveness of 
IYCF-E interventions. Greater involvement by donors to advocate 
for IYCF interventions could have enabled more agencies to get 
involved in the crisis, while the IYCF-E sector itself still represents a 
challenge and a new area for many organisations, as seen in other 
crises including Syria, Lebanon and Jordan.
The difficulties inherent to this specific context have 
highlighted the need to revise and adapt IYCF-E guidelines to 
enable the quick provision of operational assistance. Lessons 
are currently being documented and analysed by global 
IYCF experts to inform existing guidelines and ensure that 
knowledge and practices gained during these past months 
can inform future programming.
Minh Tram Le is Nutrition Coordinator for the European 
Refugee and Migrant Crisis, Save the Children International. 
Claudine Prudhon is Researcher – Infant and Young Child 
Feeding in Emergencies, Save the Children UK. Anne-Marie 
Mayer is an independent consultant. Megan Gayford is Senior 
Humanitarian Nutrition Advisor, Save the Children UK. We 
would like to thank Mardjan Abidian and Nisrine Jaafar for 
their great work as interpreters during the infant and young 
child feeding assessment in February 2016. 
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Since 2015, more than a million women, men and children have 
undertaken perilous journeys to reach northern European 
countries, using unofficial migration routes across the 
Mediterranean and South-East Europe.1 Not all of them have 
reached their preferred destination, and many have died or gone 
missing on the way. These people reflect diverse nationalities 
and languages and varying levels of literacy, income, social 
status and access to technology. But findings in a recent BBC 
Media Action research report show that many have one key 
thing in common: they require information to make decisions 
about their next steps, to remain safe and meet their minimum 
survival needs. And yet, even in this age of digital technology, 
they often cannot get the reliable information they need due to 
a lack of online or mobile connectivity and limited consistent 
information that they trust.
The research study was commissioned and funded by UK aid 
from the UK government through the Start Network European 
Refugee Response Programme and the CDAC Network to help 
humanitarian agencies understand the priority information and 
communication needs of refugees. Field research, conducted 
by BBC Media Action in partnership with Development and 
Humanitarian Learning in Action (DAHLIA), provides a snapshot 
of refugees’ experiences regarding communication and 
information at different points on their journey:  on the route, 
in ‘transit’ camps in Greece and, for those who have managed 
to reach it, in Germany.2 In-depth interviews with humanitarian 
actors in Greece and Germany were also conducted to capture 
their understanding of refugees’ communication needs, and the 
challenges they faced in trying to meet them.3  
The research was carried out in April 2016, just weeks after the 
closure of the Western Balkans route left more than 46,000 
people stranded in camps in Greece.4 Despite being ‘static’, 
almost all of the refugees interviewed considered themselves to 
be still on a journey – either back to their country of origin or on 
their way to their destination country – and believed that things 
could change at any moment. 
Refugee needs
The findings from this research highlight refugees’ overarching 
need for critical information about their current and future 
situation, as well as their broader communication needs: to 
be listened to; to be able to tell their stories; and to participate 
in dialogue that provides them with physical, social and 
psychosocial support. Many refugees also need trauma 
counselling.
The research found that refugees had one overriding com-
munication need, both throughout their journey and when 
static in camps: timely and reliable information on how to 
get to their next destination safely, quickly and without being 
detained. Unfortunately this was a need that humanitarian 
actors were often not able to fulfil, either because they did 
not know the answers or because they were restricted in what 
information they were able to provide.
‘We need someone to translate for us, to communicate our 
needs and give us answers to our questions.’
Despite determined work by agencies on the ground, refugees 
interviewed in Greece tended to be confused about their status 
and legal rights – not knowing what point they had reached in 
the asylum process, often holding papers in languages they 
didn’t understand, and frustrated by an application process 
that they perceived as unfair. Some said their journey to Europe 
and experience in the camps was worse than living in a war 
zone, since at least then they knew where they were and had a 
home, even if their lives were at risk. Refugees living in shelters 
in Germany, for whom life was often much harder than they 
Voices of refugees: information and communication needs of refugees 
in Greece and Germany
Theo Hannides, Nicola Bailey and Dwan Kaoukji
A Red Cross billboard giving information on family tracing services and Internet 
access at Gevgelija transit camp, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).
©Caroline Haga/IFRC
1 UNHCR, Refugees/Migrants Emergency Response – Mediterranean, 2016, 
http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php. 
2 A total of 66 refugees from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq participated in the 
study in formal and informal camps in Greece. An additional 13 interviews 
took place in Germany, along with 16 focus group discussions.
3 A short film inspired by the research, available at https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=m1BLsySgsHM, has had almost 950,000 views on Facebook and 
YouTube.
4 As of 11 April 2016: Amnesty International, Trapped in Greece: An Avoidable 
Refugee Crisis, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur25/3778/2016/en.
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had expected, had no official rights to live or work there, no 
knowledge of whether they would be allowed to stay, and were 
confused about their rights and asylum status. 
Refugees wanted to know: what was next 
for them?
Aside from questions about their rights, their options and their 
status, refugees in formal and informal camps in Greece said 
that they needed basic information about the logistics of daily 
living, including how to stay safe and where to find healthcare, 
but often had no common language to communicate with 
service providers. They voiced concerns about a lack of 
translators – especially Farsi/Dari-speakers – to liaise between 
them and agencies, and also expressed mistrust of translators 
used in asylum interviews.
Trust was a key theme from the research: who could refugees 
trust for information? Often they did not have a choice, and 
had to put their ‘trust’ in whoever could supply relevant 
information when they needed it most. Faced with an 
information vacuum or low confidence in official sources, 
which they perceived to be unreliable, they often sought help 
from people smugglers, who could provide information about 
alternative options, even if it turned out to be untrue.
The study showed that refugees who stay in regular contact 
with other refugees and who have wide communication 
networks of family members and friends (via mobile networks 
and social networking sites such as Facebook and WhatsApp) 
were likely to be more resilient than those who were less 
connected. The latter, particularly Afghan refugees, tended 
to rely more heavily on smugglers and their travel group for 
information on their journey, and were often cut off from 
contact with family and friends.
‘We need access to the internet to find information and 
communicate with our family at home.’
Challenges for humanitarian agencies
Chief among the challenges facing humanitarian agencies 
in meeting refugees’ information and communication needs 
was that they did not know when and whether borders 
would open to allow the refugees to continue their journey. 
While they wanted to share helpful, accurate information, 
agencies knew that the situation could quickly change and 
was outside their control. In April 2016, humanitarian agency 
staff in Greece reviewed the research findings at a workshop 
in Athens. They discussed initiatives which were already 
under way, alongside possible ways to better meet refugees’ 
information and communication needs. Since the research 
was conducted, humanitarian agencies have explored new 
initiatives to communicate effectively with refugees in 
Box 1 Suggestions from refugees and 
humanitarians 
1.  Have focal points within the camps who speak the 
right languages, can communicate people’s needs and 
concerns to agencies, and provide answers. 
2.   Have more legal advisers in the camps (with 
translators), who can consider people’s individual cases 
and advise them on their options. 
 ‘We need one-to-one appointments with legal advisers, 
to help us understand our rights and our options.’ 
3. Hold regular meetings within the camps to update 
refugees on the current situation, preferably led by EU/
government officials. 
 ‘They could gather everyone together in meetings to 
share important updates.’
4. Improve connectivity. Although free wi-fi is available 
in some camps, all camps need it to enable people 
to connect to their families and other sources of 
information. 
5.  Improve face-to-face communication between 
humanitarians and refugees, via people who speak the 
right language. 
6.  Strengthen the capacity of responders (NGO, volunteer, 
government) to communicate complex information on 
rights and asylum in a simple, accurate way.
7.  Share critical information about refugee needs and 
legal issues between agencies.
appropriate languages, in an attempt to improve the daily 
reality for the diverse groups of people who remain static in 
Greece.
Theo Hannides, Nicola Bailey and Dwan Kaoukji are 
researchers from BBC Media Action. This article is amended 
from the Executive Summary of the BBC Media Action research 
report Voices of Refugees: Information and Communication 
Needs of Refugees in Greece and Germany, published in July 
2016. The content of the report is the responsibility of BBC 
Media Action. Any views expressed in the report should not 
be taken to represent those of the BBC itself, or any donors 
supporting the work of BBC Media Action. BBC Media Action 
is the BBC’s international development charity. It is not 
funded by the BBC licence fee but is supported by grants 
and donations from a range of institutions, foundations and 
individuals.
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The Start Network European Refugee Response: trialling a 
collaborative approach to a regional crisis 
Emily Whitehead
In October 2015, the UK Department for International Develop-
ment (DFID) allocated £16 million to the Start Network in 
response to the refugee and migration crisis in Europe. 
Seventeen humanitarian agencies were selected to implement 
projects in five countries along migration routes from Turkey 
to Germany and other European destination countries. The 
first phase, carried out over 5–6 months, consisted of a variety 
of humanitarian assistance and protection activities.1 This 
article critically reflects on the response, explaining how 
it was established and the range of projects implemented, 
and concludes with the main findings of an independent 
evaluation.
The Start Network
The Start Network is a network of 39 NGOs focusing on crisis 
response and preparedness.2 Over the last three years, the 
Network has shown that aid can be channelled to those in 
need within 72 hours of an emergency for short 45-day 
life-saving responses through the Start Fund mechanism. 
In 2015, the Network began piloting an alternative funding 
mechanism designed to encourage greater communication, 
cooperation and coordination between members. Initial 
pilots of such ‘collaborative responses’ include supporting 
refugees in Cameroon and helping governments and 
communities in West Africa prevent and prepare for possible 
disease outbreaks.
A collaborative response to the European 
refugee and migrant crisis
On 29 July 2015, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) 
submitted an alert to the Start Fund after an assessment of 
the situation in Lesvos earlier in the month. The Start Fund 
was unable to approve funds due to a clause in its guidelines 
stating that the money could not be used in OECD countries, 
and the context demanded a larger-scale response than the 
Start Fund’s 45-day project cycle mechanism could support. 
1 Phase 2 ended on 31 August with an additional £5m from DFID. 2 Start Network members: http://www.startnetwork.org/the-network.  
A refugee from Iraq rests with his family in an Oxfam shelter after arriving in Greece by boat from Turkey.
©Pablo Tosco/Oxfam
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Table 1 Activities per agency and country
Agencies Countries of operation Sectors
ACAPS/MapAction Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia,  • Provision of information and communicating with 
 FYROM, Greece  communities
ActionAid Greece • Provision of information and communicating with  
   communities
  • Protection and referral of vulnerable groups 
CARE Croatia, Serbia • Improving WASH
Christian Aid Serbia • Cash transfer programmes
Catholic Relief Services  Serbia, FYROM, Greece • Provision of information and communicating with  
   communities
  • Protection and referral of vulnerable groups
  • Camp management and shelter
Doctors of the World Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia,  • Protection and referral of vulnerable groups
 FYROM, Greece • Access to medical care
Danish Refugee  Serbia, Macedonia, Greece • Provision of information and communicating with  
Council   communities
  • Protection and referral of vulnerable groups
  • Improving WASH
  • Food security 
  • Camp management and shelter
International Medical Greece • Improving WASH 
Corps  • Access to medical care 
International Rescue  Greece • Protection and referral of vulnerable groups
Committee  • Improving WASH
  • Camp management and shelter
Mercy Corps Serbia, FYROM, Greece • Protection and referral of vulnerable groups
  • Food security 
  • Cash transfer programmes
Norwegian Refugee  Greece • Protection and referral of vulnerable groups
Council  • Improving WASH
  • Camp management and shelter
Oxfam Serbia, FYROM, Greece • Protection and referral of vulnerable groups
  • Food security and livelihoods
Samaritan’s Purse Croatia, Greece • Distribution of NFIs for winterisation
  • Improving WASH
  • Camp management and shelter
  • Cash transfer programmes 
Internews Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia,  • Provision of information and communicating with  
 FYROM, Greece  communities
Save the Children Croatia, Serbia, FYROM, Greece • Protection and referral of vulnerable groups
  • Distribution of NFIs for winterisation
  • Improving WASH
  • Food security 
Translators without  Croatia, Serbia, FYROM, Greece • Provision of information and communicating with  
Borders   communities
World Vision Serbia • Protection and referral of vulnerable groups
  • Distribution of NFIs for winterisation 
After consultations with DFID a £5m funding envelope was 
announced, shortly followed by an additional commit-
ment of £11m. Although the funding came at a critical time, 
the consultation process was lengthy, with funding finally 
approved by DFID on 26 October 2016.
The Start Network European Refugee Response (ERR) used 
the ‘collaborative response’ approach trialled in Cameroon 
and West Africa. A call for proposals was released in early 
November 2015 and two project selection committees 
were convened. Start Network member and non-member 
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agencies were represented at country and HQ level. The 
process for project design, locations, sectors, priorities and 
decision-making was completed in two weeks. Seventeen 
Start Network member and non-member agencies were 
selected to implement projects in Greece, Croatia, the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Slovenia 
and Serbia. Despite the challenges – including several adap-
tions in response to the decision to close borders along 
the Western Balkan route on 9 March and the EU–Turkey 
agreement on 20 March – the ERR implemented a wide 
variety of projects across multiple borders and countries 
along the Western Balkan route, addressing the needs of 
almost 1.2m refugees and migrants.
Evaluation of the ERR
The first phase of the ERR ended in April 2016, and an indepen-
dent evaluation was commissioned. The evaluation, conducted 
by Groupe URD, is framed around the criteria of relevance, 
effectiveness, efficiency and collaborative advantage.
Relevance and appropriateness
Relevance. A substantial amount of funding came at a critical 
time to respond to the needs of migrants and refugees along the 
Balkans route just before the winter, providing ERR agencies 
and their local partners with much-needed resources to scale 
up their assistance. Nevertheless, advocacy with European 
donors, institutions and other stakeholders was a significant 
gap, particularly on protection issues. 
Coverage. The range of programmes and agencies funded 
through the ERR meant that needs were broadly covered, 
including an innovative ‘communicating with refugees’ com-
ponent. However, the lack of communication and coordination 
between agencies resulted in some overlaps and gaps, and 
there was no ‘whole of route’ vision or a regional approach to 
support cross-border coordination. 
Adaptability and responsiveness. Given the fast-changing 
context, flexibility and adaptability were undoubtedly the main 
strengths of the ERR, and agencies rated the brokering role of 
the Start Network very highly compared to traditional modes 
of donor interaction (particularly the rapidity of the decision-
making process). The relevance of ERR activities essentially 
relied on the professionalism and expertise of the individual 
agencies as far as programming and needs assessments were 
concerned. Despite attempts, the Start Network was not in a 
position to set up or promote any mechanism for joint needs 
assessments or coordinated programming. 
Effectiveness
The limited timeframe, as well as delays to the start of 
implementation and an inability to obtain no-cost extensions 
for activities, had a negative impact on the effectiveness of the 
response. This was particularly the case when agencies based 
their decisions on the criterion of rapid disbursement, rather 
than on the reality of needs. 
Some efforts were made to work with local authorities and 
populations in the different countries. Coordination with local 
NGOs and authorities was particularly successful in FYROM, 
where NGOs provided local knowledge while ERR agencies 
contributed additional funding and skills. Some agencies 
invested significant amounts of money in camp maintenance 
and improving infrastructure in anticipation of a lengthy crisis.
Efficiency
Allocating funds through the Start Network allowed DFID 
to ‘outsource’ programme management and monitoring at 
short notice. This delegated allocation process lightened 
administrative procedures and allowed a high degree of 
flexibility in programme management.
Although a variety of products and communication channels 
were used, the information circulated by the Start Network did 
not reach the vast majority of operational staff in ERR agencies 
(this is probably linked to the lack of a permanent field presence 
by Start Network staff during most of the programme). The 
wide range of monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) 
products (situational reports, learning workshops, monitoring 
visits, case studies, peer reviews) provided a good overview 
of the projects, but did not include crisis management or 
situational analysis, which could have guided crisis response 
and strategic positioning. 
Communication and coordination were strengthened at a 
later stage of the response (around February–March 2016), 
thanks to field coordination meetings and closer ties between 
ERR agencies. No formal mechanism for coordination among 
the ERR agencies was set up, with priority given to ‘all agency 
cooperation and coordination’ rather than specific collective 
action among ERR agencies.
Collaborative mechanism
The use of the term ‘collaborative response’ raised expec-
tations. There was no clarity or consensus about the principles 
and practical feasibility of a collaborative approach, and 
no joint programming (agencies were unwilling to agree an 
overall framework of outcomes and outputs). Among the key 
ingredients of a collaborative response are the presence of 
Start Network focal points in the field and the decentralisation 
of selection processes. 
Recommendations for future collaborative 
responses
Groupe URD proposed six key recommendations to the Start 
Network at a time when the Network was evaluating the 
collaborative response mechanism as a whole. In collaboration 
with member agencies, the Start Network team facilitated the 
development of standard operating procedures for a modified 
collaborative response model, putting the recommendations 
from Groupe URD into practical solutions for the future. The 
recommendations are outlined below, with responses to 
explain how they will be addressed by the Network. 
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Recommendation 1: Before the implementation of 
any collaborative response, the Start Network and 
the agencies involved should build a shared and 
collective vision
Start Network response: Collaboration will be facilitated at three 
key stages: crisis alert and donor negotiation, programme design 
and programme implementation. There will be a particularly 
strong focus on collaboration during programme design.
After the initial crisis alert and negotiations with donors, Start 
Network members will work with other stakeholders to map 
out gaps in humanitarian provision and collectively design a 
response plan to form the basis for the call for proposals. The 
process from needs assessment to the call for proposals will 
include member representatives, donors and other relevant 
external actors (UN agencies, local NGOs, sectoral experts). 
This will involve active engagement in person, through a 
collaborative mapping and strategic planning workshop of 1–2 
days in country.
Recommendation 2: The Start Network should 
identify the appropriate set-up (in terms of 
processes, structure and outputs) in order to 
achieve collectively defined objectives
Start Network response: Member representatives will agree 
the model and degree of collaboration at the collaborative 
mapping and strategic planning workshop. Once member 
agencies have received confirmation of funding, a ‘start-up 
workshop’ will be held in country to provide an opportunity for 
organisations to agree collaborative activities. Not all partners 
are required to be involved in all collaboration initiatives; 
collaboration should only be pursued where appropriate, and 
where it will add value to the response. 
Recommendation 3: The Start Network should 
review the current structure of ERR management 
and MEL services, including field presence, to 
inform future collaborative responses
Start Network response: For each response, a Programme 
Management Unit will be established with clearly defined and 
communicated roles and responsibilities. The Unit will consist 
of at least three people: a Programme Manager, Finance and 
Awards Officer and a Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability 
and Learning (MEAL) Officer/Coordinator.
Recommendation 4: The Start Network should 
review and design an optimal coordination 
system, taking into account the number of agencies 
involved and the context
Start Network response: The dedicated Programme Manager 
will be based in country and will coordinate in person with 
implementing agencies, as well as within wider humanitarian 
coordination mechanisms. Internal coordination systems will be 
designed during the start-up workshop, based on the context. 
Recommendation 5: Strengthen the operational 
benefits of MEL services
Start Network response: MEAL will be carried out by a Start 
Network member selected by open tender every two years. 
Each response will have a MEAL framework, with an increased 
focus at the project/agency level, standardised indicators and 
clearer guidance on sources of information and frequency of 
collection. MEAL will also identify issues of common interest 
(strategic, operational, advocacy) to be further addressed 
through commissioned studies or during workshops and 
coordination meetings.
Recommendation 6: The Start Network should 
establish a robust communication and information 
management system
Start Network response: As soon as a Start Response alert 
is triggered, a Box Folder  (a cloud-based platform) will be 
opened to ensure that information is available to participating 
agencies. All proposals and reports should be uploaded to 
the Folder, with documents saved in a specific format. Each 
response will also include a coordination/collaboration enve- 
lope within response budgets for communication and inform-
ation management, covering costs such as online or mobile 
technologies, workshops and meetings.
Conclusion
The ERR provided an alternative model for NGOs to respond 
collectively to a regional humanitarian crisis. While the 
approach was innovative and ambitious, the evaluation has 
highlighted some of the obstacles that continue to plague 
attempts to create more collaborative responses. However, 
there is the appetite amongst humanitarian organisations 
to create processes which allow resources to be utilised in a 
more effective, collective and collaborative manner. The Start 
Network does not claim to have found the key to revolutionise 
the humanitarian sector; rather, we are trying to open up a 
space for experimentation and learning, building on examples 
of good coordination and collaboration. Both the successes 
and challenges of the ERR will now be reflected on and will 
be fed into the processes and practices implemented for the 
Network’s next major humanitarian response.
Emily Whitehead is Collaborative Responses Programme 
Manager at the Start Network.
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